Comparative Cognitive Anthropology -

Research

Cross-Cultural Cognitive Variability. The first subproject of the Comparative Cognitive Anthropology research group aims to understand both constancy and variation in human cognition and its sources in primate inheritance on the one hand, and cultural diversity on the other. There is a working presumption of universality in human cognition, reflected in the tendency to take findings based on experiments using Western undergraduates as a basis for inferences about the human mind. However, many cognitive functions that have actually been put to the test turned out to vary across cultures. The project aims to compare specific aspects of cognition across a selected set of diverse human cultural groups and all other great ape species to gauge the extent and structure of the cross-cultural variability of cognition. We are most interested in basic domains of physical and social cognition. Ongoing projects include research on cross-cultural variability in the domains of physical cognition, such as space and time, and social cognition, such as the expression and comprehension of emotions, the structure of sharing norms and parochialism. This subproject is conducted in close collaboration with the Language & Cognition Group at the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics.

Comparative and Developmental Social Psychology. If the first aim of the project is concerned with cognitive and cultural diversity as a uniquely human trait, the second aim is to understand what makes this possible – that is, the psychological mechanisms underlying characteristically human social behavior. The general question is what mental characteristics afford the human mode of social life, marked by cultural specification and accumulation. No other animal exhibits anywhere close to the kind of variability across populations as the human species. Even the other great apes, arguable some of the most cognitively flexible non-human animals, display only a relatively small number of stable behavioral differences across groups. This fact becomes even more striking when one considers that humans vary much less genetically from each other than any other great ape species. Hence, genetically similar people, living in similar environments, demonstrate dramatic differences in their traditions, behavior, and cognition. These differences are maintained through time despite factors such as migration and intermarriage, which constantly mix individuals from different neighboring groups. Given a long enough time span, all differences between groups should disappear, while, in fact, they do not. Instead of diminishing, cross-group differences in humans are maintained by a complex set of derived socio-psychological mechanisms including for example be-like-you social learning in which the motivation to affiliate produces highly means-oriented imitative behavior and a strong tendency to conform to the behavior of those in one's group. This subproject is conducted in close collaboration with the Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology at the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology.

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Comparative Cognitive Anthropology -

Research