Publications

Abstract

In the first decade of neurocognitive word production research the predominant approach was brain mapping, i.e., investigating the regional cerebral brain activation patterns correlated with word production tasks, such as picture naming and word generation. Indefrey and Levelt (2004) conducted a comprehensive meta-analysis of word production studies that used this approach and combined the resulting spatial information on neural correlates of component processes of word production with information on the time course of word production provided by behavioral and electromagnetic studies. In recent years, neurocognitive word production research has seen a major change toward a hypothesis-testing approach. This approach is characterized by the design of experimental variables modulating single component processes of word production and testing for predicted effects on spatial or temporal neurocognitive signatures of these components. This change was accompanied by the development of a broader spectrum of measurement and analysis techniques. The article reviews the findings of recent studies using the new approach. The time course assumptions of Indefrey and Levelt (2004) have largely been confirmed requiring only minor adaptations. Adaptations of the brain structure/function relationships proposed by Indefrey and Leven (2004) include the precise role of subregions of the left inferior frontal gyrus as well as a probable, yet to date unclear role of the inferior parietal cortex in word production.

Abstract

Deletions and reciprocal duplications of the chromosome 16p13.1 region have recently been reported in several cases of autism and mental retardation (MR). As genomic copy number variants found in these two disorders may also associate with schizophrenia, we examined 4345 schizophrenia patients and 35 079 controls from 8 European populations for duplications and deletions at the 16p13.1 locus, using microarray data. We found a threefold excess of duplications and deletions in schizophrenia cases compared with controls, with duplications present in 0.30% of cases versus 0.09% of controls (P=0.007) and deletions in 0.12 % of cases and 0.04% of controls (P>0.05). The region can be divided into three intervals defined by flanking low copy repeats. Duplications spanning intervals I and II showed the most significant (P=0.00010) association with schizophrenia. The age of onset in duplication and deletion carriers among cases ranged from 12 to 35 years, and the majority were males with a family history of psychiatric disorders. In a single Icelandic family, a duplication spanning intervals I and II was present in two cases of schizophrenia, and individual cases of alcoholism, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and dyslexia. Candidate genes in the region include NTAN1 and NDE1. We conclude that duplications and perhaps also deletions of chromosome 16p13.1, previously reported to be associated with autism and MR, also confer risk of schizophrenia.

Abstract

We investigated whether seeing a pointing gesture influences the perceived lexical stress. A pitch contour continuum between the Dutch words “CAnon” (‘canon’) and “kaNON” (‘cannon’) was presented along with a pointing gesture during the first or the second syllable. Pointing gestures following natural recordings but not Gaussian functions influenced stress perception (Experiment 1 and 2), especially when auditory context preceded (Experiment 2). This was not replicated in Experiment 3. Natural pointing gestures failed to affect the categorization of a pitch peak timing continuum (Experiment 4). There is thus no convincing evidence that seeing a pointing gesture influences lexical stress perception.

Abstract

Listeners use lexical knowledge to adjust to speakers’ idiosyncratic pronunciations. Dutch listeners learn to interpret an ambiguous sound between /s/ and /f/ as /f/ if they hear it word-finally in Dutch words normally ending in /f/, but as /s/ if they hear it in normally /s/-final words. Here, we examined two positional effects in lexically guided retuning. In Experiment 1, ambiguous sounds during exposure always appeared in word-initial position (replacing the first sounds of /f/- or /s/-initial words). No retuning was found. In Experiment 2, the same ambiguous sounds always appeared word-finally during exposure. Here, retuning was found. Lexically guided perceptual learning thus appears to emerge reliably only when lexical knowledge is available as the to-be-tuned segment is initially being processed. Under these conditions, however, lexically guided retuning was position independent: It generalized across syllabic positions. Lexical retuning can thus benefit future recognition of particular sounds wherever they appear in words.

Abstract

Eye movements made by listeners during language-mediated visual search reveal a strong link between
visual processing and conceptual processing. For example, upon hearing the word for a missing referent
with a characteristic colour (e.g., “strawberry”), listeners tend to fixate a colour-matched distractor (e.g.,
a red plane) more than a colour-mismatched distractor (e.g., a yellow plane). We ask whether these
shifts in visual attention are mediated by the retrieval of lexically stored colour labels. Do children
who do not yet possess verbal labels for the colour attribute that spoken and viewed objects have in
common exhibit language-mediated eye movements like those made by older children and adults?
That is, do toddlers look at a red plane when hearing “strawberry”? We observed that 24-montholds
lacking colour term knowledge nonetheless recognized the perceptual–conceptual commonality
between named and seen objects. This indicates that language-mediated visual search need not
depend on stored labels for concepts.

Abstract

The nature of children’s early lexical processing was investigated by asking what information 36-month-olds access and use when instructed to find a known but absent referent. Children readily retrieved stored knowledge about characteristic color, i.e. when asked to find an object with a typical color (e.g. strawberry), children tended to fixate more upon an object that had the same (e.g. red plane) as opposed to a different (e.g. yellow plane) color. They did so regardless of the fact that they have had plenty of time to recognize the pictures for what they are, i.e. planes not strawberries. These data represent the first demonstration that language-mediated shifts of overt attention in young children can be driven by individual stored visual attributes of known words that mismatch on most other dimensions. The finding suggests that lexical processing and overt attention are strongly linked from an early age.

Abstract

Studies exploring the role of neural oscillations in cognition have revealed sustained increases in alpha-band (∼8–14 Hz) power during the delay period of delayed-recognition short-term memory tasks. These increases have been proposed to reflect the inhibition, for example, of cortical areas representing task-irrelevant information, or of potentially interfering representations from previous trials. Another possibility, however, is that elevated delay-period alpha-band power (DPABP) reflects the selection and maintenance of information, rather than, or in addition to, the inhibition of task-irrelevant information. In the present study, we explored these possibilities using a delayed-recognition paradigm in which the presence and task relevance of shape information was systematically manipulated across trial blocks and electroencephalographic was used to measure alpha-band power. In the first trial block, participants remembered locations marked by identical black circles. The second block featured the same instructions, but locations were marked by unique shapes. The third block featured the same stimulus presentation as the second, but with pretrial instructions indicating, on a trial-by-trial basis, whether memory for shape or location was required, the other dimension being irrelevant. In the final block, participants remembered the unique pairing of shape and location for each stimulus. Results revealed minimal DPABP in each of the location-memory conditions, whether locations were marked with identical circles or with unique task-irrelevant shapes. In contrast, alpha-band power increases were observed in both the shape-memory condition, in which location was task irrelevant, and in the critical final condition, in which both shape and location were task relevant. These results provide support for the proposal that alpha-band oscillations reflect the retention of shape information and/or shape–location associations in short-term memory.

Abstract

A visual fixation study tested whether seven-month-olds can discriminate between different talkers. The infants were first habituated to talkers producing sentences in either a familiar or unfamiliar language, then heard test sentences from previously unheard speakers, either in the language used for habituation, or in another language. When the language at test mismatched that in habituation, infants always noticed the change. When language remained constant and only talker altered, however, infants detected the change only if the language was the native tongue. Adult listeners with a different native tongue than the infants did not reproduce the discriminability patterns shown by the infants, and infants detected neither voice nor language changes in reversed speech; both these results argue against explanation of the native-language voice discrimination in terms of acoustic properties of the stimuli. The ability to identify talkers is, like many other perceptual abilities, strongly influenced by early life experience.

Abstract

Background: Autism spectrum disorders (ASD) are characterised by social and communication difficulties in day-to-day life, including problems in recognising emotions. However, experimental investigations of emotion recognition ability in ASD have been equivocal; hampered by small sample sizes, narrow IQ range and over-focus on the visual modality. Methods: We tested 99 adolescents (mean age 15;6 years, mean IQ 85) with an ASD and 57 adolescents without an ASD (mean age 15;6 years, mean IQ 88) on a facial emotion recognition task and two vocal emotion recognition tasks (one verbal; one non-verbal). Recognition of happiness, sadness, fear, anger, surprise and disgust were tested. Using structural equation modelling, we conceptualised emotion recognition ability as a multimodal construct, measured by the three tasks. We examined how the mean levels of recognition of the six emotions differed by group (ASD vs. non-ASD) and IQ (>= 80 vs. < 80). Results: There was no significant difference between groups for the majority of emotions and analysis of error patterns suggested that the ASD group were vulnerable to the same pattern of confusions between emotions as the non-ASD group. However, recognition ability was significantly impaired in the ASD group for surprise. IQ had a strong and significant effect on performance for the recognition of all six emotions, with higher IQ adolescents outperforming lower IQ adolescents. Conclusions: The findings do not suggest a fundamental difficulty with the recognition of basic emotions in adolescents with ASD.

Abstract

Social structure in human societies is underpinned by the variable expression of ideas about relatedness between different types of kin. We express these ideas through language in our kin terminology: to delineate who is kin and who is not, and to attach meanings to the types of kin labels associated with different individuals. Cross-culturally, there is a regular and restricted range of patterned variation in kin terminologies, and to date, our understanding of this diversity has been hampered by inadequate techniques for dealing with the hierarchical relatedness of languages (Galton’s Problem). Here I use maximum-likelihood and Bayesian phylogenetic comparative methods to begin to tease apart the processes underlying the evolution of kin terminologies in the Austronesian language family, focusing on terms for siblings. I infer (1) the probable ancestral states and (2) evolutionary models of change for the semantic distinctions of relative age (older/younger sibling) and relative sex (same sex/opposite-sex). Analyses show that early Austronesian languages contained the relative-age, but not the relative-sex distinction; the latter was reconstructed firmly only for the ancestor of Eastern Malayo-Polynesian languages. Both distinctions were best characterized by evolutionary models where the gains and losses of the semantic distinctions were equally likely. A multi-state model of change examined how the relative-sex distinction could be elaborated and found that some transitions in kin terms were not possible: jumps from absence to heavily elaborated were very unlikely, as was piece-wise dismantling of elaborate distinctions. Cultural ideas about what types of kin distinctions are important can be embedded in the semantics of language; using a phylogenetic evolutionary framework we can understand how those distinctions in meaning change through time.

Abstract

Baby's begrijpen woorden eerder dan dat ze deze zeggen. Dit stadium is onderbelicht want moeilijk waarneembaar. Caroline Junge onderzocht de vaardigheden die nodig zijn voor het leren van de eerste woordjes: conceptherkenning, woordherkenning en het verbinden van woord aan betekenis. Daarvoor bestudeerde ze de hersenpotentialen van het babybrein tijdens het horen van woordjes. Junge stelt vast dat baby's van negen maanden al woordbegrip hebben. En dat is veel vroeger dan tot nu toe bekend was. Als baby's een woord hoorde dat niet klopte met het plaatje dat ze zagen, lieten ze een N400-effect zien, een klassiek hersenpotentiaal. Uit eerder Duits onderzoek is gebleken dat baby's van twaalf maanden dit effect nog niet laten zien, omdat de hersenen nog niet rijp zouden zijn. Het onderzoek van Junge weerlegt dit. Ook laat ze zien dat als baby's goed woorden kunnen herkennen binnen zinnetjes, dit belangrijk is voor hun latere taalontwikkeling, wat mogelijk tot nieuwe therapieën voor taalstoornissen zal leiden.

Abstract

Day-to-day interpretations of “space” are enmeshed in specific cultural and linguistic practices. For example, many cultures have an association between vertical height and social standing; more powerful people may be placed literally higher than others at social gatherings, and be spoken of as having higher status. This questionnaire is a guide for exploring relationships between space, language, and social structure. The goal is to better understand how space is organised in the focus community, and to investigate the extent to which space is used as a model for reproducing social forms.

Abstract

Theorists of language have argued that co-­speech hand gestures are an
intentional part of social communication. The present study provides evidence for these
claims by showing that speakers adjust their gesture use according to their perceived relevance to the audience. Participants were asked to read about items that were and were not useful in a wilderness survival scenario, under the pretense that they would then
explain (on camera) what they learned to one of two different audiences. For one audience (a group of college students in a dormitory orientation activity), the stakes of successful
communication were low;; for the other audience (a group of students preparing for a
rugged camping trip in the mountains), the stakes were high. In their explanations to the camera, participants in the high stakes condition produced three times as many
representational gestures, and spent three times as much time gesturing, than participants in the low stakes condition. This study extends previous research by showing that the anticipated consequences of one’s communication—namely, the degree to which information may be useful to an intended recipient—influences speakers’ use of gesture.

Abstract

It is an important feature of the human sentence production system that semantic and syntactic processes may overlap in time and do not proceed strictly serially. That is, the process of building the syntactic form of an utterance does not always wait until the complete semantic content for that utterance has been decided upon. On the contrary, speakers will often start pronouncing the first words of a sentence while still working on further details of its semantic content. An important advantage is memory economy. Semantic and syntactic fragments do not have to occupy working memory until complete semantic and syntactic structures for an utterance have been computed. Instead, each semantic and syntactic fragment is processed as soon as possible and is kept in working memory for a minimum period of time. This raises the question of how the sentence production system can maintain syntactic coherence across syntactic fragments. Presumably there are processes of "syntactic bookkeeping" which (1) store in working memory those syntactic properties of a fragmentary sentence which are needed to eliminate ungrammatical continuations, and (2) check whether a prospective continuation is indeed compatible with the sentence constructed so far. In reaction time experiments where subjects described, under time pressure, simple static pictures of an action performed by an actor, the second aspect of syntactic bookkeeping could be demonstrated. This evidence is used for modelling bookkeeping processes as part of a computational sentence generator which aims at simulating the syntactic operations people carry out during spontaneous speech.

Abstract

Human speakers often produce sentences incrementally. They can start speaking having in mind only a fragmentary idea of what they want to say, and while saying this they refine the contents underlying subsequent parts of the utterance. This capability imposes a number of constraints on the design of a syntactic processor. This paper explores these constraints and evaluates some recent computational sentence generators from the perspective of incremental production.

Abstract

Remarques sur les facteurs intervenant dans le processus de formulation des énoncés.

Abstract

Comments on a study by Frazier and others on Dutch-language lexical processing. Claims that the control condition in the experiment was inadequate and that an assumption made by Frazier about closed class verbal items is inaccurate, and proposes an alternative account of a subset of the data from the experiment

Abstract

Raises objections to L. Frazier et al's (see record 1994-32229-001) report of an experimental study intended to test Schreuder's (1990) Morphological Integration (MI) model concerning the processing of separable and inseparable verbs and shows that the logic of the experiment is flawed. The problem is rooted in the notion of a separable complex verb. The conclusion is drawn that Frazier et al's experimental data cannot be taken as evidence for the theoretical propositions they develop about the MI model.

Abstract

The psychology of language as developed by Wilhelm Wundt in his fundamental work Die Sprache (1900) has a strongly mentalistic character. The dominating positions held by behaviorism in psychology and structuralism in linguistics have overruled Wundt’s language theory to the effect that it has remained relatively unknown. This situation has changed recently under the influence of transformational linguistics and cognitive psychology. The paper discusses how Wundt applied the basic psychological concepts of apperception and association to language behavior, in particular to the construction and production of sentences during unprepared speech. The final part of the paper is devoted to the work, published in 1917, of the Dutch linguistic scholar Jacques van Ginneken, who elaborated Wundt’s ideas towards an explanation of some syntactic phenomena during the language acquisition of children.

Abstract

In this paper we report on a visual world eye-tracking experiment that investigated the differing abilities of adults and children to use referential scene information during reanalysis to overcome lexical biases during sentence processing. The results showed that adults incorporated aspects of the referential scene into their parse as soon as it became apparent that a test sentence was syntactically ambiguous, suggesting they considered the two alternative analyses in parallel. In contrast, the children appeared not to reanalyze their initial analysis, even over shorter distances than have been investigated in prior research. We argue that this reflects the children's over-reliance on bottom-up, lexical cues to interpretation. The implications for the development of parsing routines are discussed

Abstract

This paper considers the use and representation of Australian hypocoristics (e.g., choccie → chocolate, arvo → afternoon). One-hundred-and-fifteen adult speakers of Australian English aged 17–84 years generated as many tokens of hypocoristics as they could in 10 min. The resulting corpus was analysed along a number of dimensions in an attempt to identify (i) general age- and gender-related trends in hypocoristic knowledge and use, and (ii) linguistic properties of each hypocoristic class. Following Bybee’s (1985, 1995) lexical network approach, we conclude that Australian hypocoristics are the product of the same linguistic processes that capture other inflectional morphological processes.

Abstract

The present paper reports on a study that investigated the role of procedural and declarative memory in the acquisition of Finnish past tense morphology. Two competing models were tested. Ullman's (2004) declarative/procedural model predicts that procedural memory supports the acquisition of regular morphology, whereas declarative memory supports the acquisition of irregular morphology. In contrast, single-route approaches predict that declarative memory should support lexical learning, which in turn should predict morphological acquisition. One-hundred and twenty-four (N=124) monolingual Finnish-speaking children aged 4;0–6;7 completed tests of procedural and declarative memory, tests of vocabulary knowledge and nonverbal ability, and a test of past test knowledge. The results best supported the single-route approach, suggesting that this account best extends to languages that possess greater morphological complexity than English.

Abstract

This task investigates the expression of “enter” and “exit” events, and is a supplement to the Motion Elicitation task (https://doi.org/10.17617/2.3003391). Consultants are asked to describe a series of animated clips where a man moves into or out of a house. The clips focus on contrasts to do with perspective (e.g., whether the man appears to move away or towards the viewer) and transitional movement (e.g., whether the man walks or “teleports” into his new location).

Abstract

Do our hands 'speak the same language' across cultures? Gesture is the silent partner of spoken languages in face-to-face interaction, but we still have a lot to learn about gesture practices in different speech communities. The primary purpose of this task is to collect data in naturalistic settings that can be used to investigate the linguistic and cultural relativity of gesture performance, especially spatially indicative gestures. It involves video-recording pairs of speakers in both free conversation and more structured communication tasks (e.g., describing film plots).

Please note: the stimuli mentioned in this entry are available elsewhere: 'The Pear Story', a short film made at the University of California at Berkeley; "Frog, where are you?" from the original Mayer (1969) book, as published in the Appendix of Berman & Slobin (1994).

Abstract

In the first, critical part of this study, a small sample of simple German sentences with their empirically determined pitch contours is used to demonstrate the incorrectness of numerous currently hold views of German sentence intonation. In the second, more constructive part, several interrogative sentence types are analysed and an attempt is made to show that intonation, besides other functions, indicates the permantently changing 'thematic score' in on-going discourse as well as certain validity claims.

Abstract

Nannten die Erwachsenen irgend einen Gegenstand und wandten sie sich dabei ihm zu, so nahm ich das wahr und ich begriff, daß der Gegenstand durch die Laute, die sie aussprachen, bezeichnet wurde, da sie auf ihn hinweisen wollten. Dies aber entnahm ich aus ihren Gebärden, der natürlichen Sprache aller Völker, der Sprache, die durch Mienen- und Augenspiel, durch die Bewegungen der Glieder und den Klang der Stimme die Empfindungen der Seele anzeigt, wenn diese irgend etwas begehrt, oder festhält, oder zurückweist, oder flieht. So lernte ich nach und nach verstehen, welche Dinge die Wörter bezeichneten, die ich wieder und wieder, an ihren bestimmten Stellen in verschiedenen Sätzen, aussprechen hörte. Und ich brachte, als nun mein Mund sich an diese Zeichen gewöhnt hatte, durch sie meine Wünsche zum Ausdruck. (Augustinus, Confessiones I, 8) Dies ist das Zitat eines Zitats: Zu Beginn der Philosophischen Untersuchungen führt Ludwig Wittgenstein diese Stelle aus Augustinus’ Bekenntnissen an, in denen dieser beschreibt, wie er seiner Erinnerung nach seine Muttersprache gelernt hat (Wittgenstein führt den lateinischen Text an und gibt dann seine Übersetzung, hier ist nur letztere zitiert). Sie bilden den Ausgangspunkt für Wittgensteins berühmte Überlegungen über die Funktionsweise der menschlichen Sprache und für seine Idee des Sprachspiels. Nun weiß man nicht, wie genau sich Augustinus wirklich erinnert und ob er sich all dies, wie so viel, was seither über den Spracherwerb gesagt und geschrieben wurde, bloß zurechtgelegt hat, in der Meinung, so müsse es sein. Aber anders als so vieles, was seither über den Spracherwerb gesagt und geschrieben wurde, ist es wunderbar formuliert und enthält zwei Momente, die in der wissenschaftlichen Forschung bis heute, wenn denn nicht bestritten, so doch oft nicht gesehen und dort, wo sie denn gesehen, nicht wirklich ernstgenommen wurden: A. Wir lernen die Sprache in der alltäglichen Kommunikation mit der sozialen Umgebung. B. Um eine Sprache zu lernen, genügt es nicht, diese Sprache zu hören; vielmehr benötigen wir eine Fülle an begleitender Information, wie hier Gestik und Mimik der Erwachsenen. Beides möchte man eigentlich für selbstverständlich halten. Herodot erzählt die berühmte Geschichte des Pharaos Psammetich, der wissen wollte, was die erste und eigentliche Sprache der Menschen sei, und befahl, zwei Neugeborene aufwachsen zu lassen, ohne dass jemand zu ihnen spricht; das erste Wort, das sie äußern, klang, so erzählt Herodot, wie das phrygische Wort für Brot, und so nahm man denn an, die Ursprache des Menschen sei das Phrygische. In dieser Vorstellung vom Spracherwerb spielt der Input aus der sozialen Umgebung nur insofern eine Rolle, als die eigentliche, von Geburt an vorhandene Sprache durch eine andere verdrängt werden kann: Kinder, die in einer englischsprachigen Umgebung aufwachsen, sprechen nicht die Ursprache. Diese Theorie gilt heute als obsolet. Sie ist aber in ihrer Einschätzung vom relativen Gewicht dessen, was an sprachlichem Wissen von Anfang an vorhanden ist, und dem, was der sozialen Umgebung entnommen werden muss, manchen neueren Theorien des Spracherwerbs nicht ganz fern: In der Chomsky’schen Idee der Universalgrammatik, theoretische Grundlage eines wesentlichen Teils der modernen Spracherwerbsforschung, ist „die Sprache” hauptsächlich etwas Angeborenes, insoweit gleich für alle Menschen und vom jeweiligen Input unabhängig. Das, was das Kind oder, beim Zweitspracherwerb, der erwachsene Lerner an Sprachlichem aus seiner Umgebung erfährt, wird nicht genutzt, um daraus bestimmte Regelhaftigkeiten abzuleiten und sich diese anzueignen; der Input fungiert eher als eine Art externer Auslöser für latent bereits vorhandenes Wissen. Für das Erlernen des Wortschatzes gilt dies sicher nicht. Es kann nicht angeboren sein, dass der Mond luna heißt. Für andere Bereiche der Sprache ist das Ausmaß des Angeborenen aber durchaus umstritten. Bei dieser Denkweise gilt das unter A Gesagte nicht. Die meisten modernen Spracherwerbsforscher schreiben dem Input ein wesentlich höheres Gewicht zu: Wir kopieren die charakteristischen Eigenschaften eines bestimmten sprachlichen Systems, indem wir den Input analysieren, um so die ihm zugrundeliegenden Regularitäten abzuleiten. Der Input tritt uns in Form von Schallfolgen (oder Gesten und später geschriebenen Zeichen) entgegen, die von anderen, die das System beherrschen, zu kommunikativen Zwecken verwendet werden. Diese Schallfolgen müssen die Lernenden in kleinere Einheiten zerlegen, diese mit Bedeutungen versehen und nach den Regularitäten abklopfen, denen gemäß sie sich zu komplexeren Ausdrücken verbinden lassen. Dies – und vieles andere – ist es, was das dem Menschen angeborene Sprachvermögen leistet, keine andere Spezies kann es (einem Pferd kann man so viel Chinesisch vorspielen, wie man will, es wird es nicht lernen). Aber auch wir könnten es nicht, wenn wir nur den Schall hätten. Wenn man, in einer Abwandlung des Psammetich’schen Versuchs, jemanden in ein Zimmer einsperren und tagaus tagein mit Chinesisch beschallen und im Übrigen gut versorgen würde, so würde er es, gleich ob als Kind oder als Erwachsener, nicht lernen. Vielleicht würde er einige strukturelle Eigenschaften des Schallstroms ausfindig machen; aber er würde auch nach Jahren kein Chinesisch können. Man benötigt den Schallstrom als sinnlich fassbaren Ausdruck der zugrundeliegenden Sprache, und man benötigt all die Informationen, die man der jeweiligen Redesituation oder aber seinem bereits vorhandenen anderweitigen Wissen entnehmen kann. Augustinus hat beides radikal vereinfacht; aber im Prinzip hat er Recht, und man sollte daher von der Spracherwerbsforschung erwarten, dass sie dies in Rechnung stellt. Das tut sie aber selten. Soweit sie überhaupt aus dem Gehäuse der Theorie tritt und sich den tatsächlichen Verlauf des Spracherwerbs anschaut, konzentriert sie sich weithin auf das, was die Kinder selbst sagen – dazu dienen ausgedehnte Corpora –, oder aber sie untersucht in experimentellen Settings, wie Kinder bestimmte Wörter oder Strukturen verstehen oder auch nicht verstehen. Das hat auch, wenn denn gut gemacht, einen hohen Aufschlusswert. Aber die eigentliche Verarbeitung des Inputs im doppelten Sinne – Schallwellen und Parallelinformation – wird selten in den Mittelpunkt des Interesses gerückt. Dies führt zu eigentümlichen Verzerrungen. So betrachtet man in der Spracherwerbsforschung vor allem deklarative Hauptsätze. Ein nicht unwesentlicher Teil dessen, was Kinder hören, besteht aber aus Imperativen („Tu das!“, „Tu das nicht!“). In solchen Imperativen gibt es normalerweise kein Subjekt. Ein intelligentes Kind muss daher zu dem Schluss kommen, dass das Deutsche in einem nicht unwesentlichen Teil seiner grammatischen Strukturen eine „pro drop-Sprache” ist, d.h. eine Sprache, in dem man das Subjekt weglassen kann. Kein Linguist käme auf diese Idee; sie entspricht aber den tatsächlichen Verhältnissen, und dies schlägt sich in dem Input, den das Kind verarbeiten muss, nieder. Dieses Heft befasst sich mit einer Spracherwerbssituation, in der – anders als beispielsweise bei einem Gespräch am Frühstückstisch – der Input in seiner doppelten Form gut zu überschauen ist, ohne dass die Situation, wie etwa bei einem kontrollierten Experiment, unnatürlich und der normalen Lernumgebung ferne wäre: mit dem Anschauen, Vorlesen und Lesen von Kinderbüchern. Man kann sich eine solche Situation als eine natürliche Ausweitung dessen vorstellen, was Augustinus beschreibt: Die Kinder hören, was die Erwachsenen sagen, und ihre Aufmerksamkeit wird auf bestimmte Dinge gerichtet, während sie hören und schauen – nur geht es hier nicht um einzelne Wörter, sondern um komplexe Ausdrücke und um komplexe, aber dennoch überschaubare begleitende Informationen. Nun haben Kinderbücher in der Spracherwerbsforschung durchaus eine Rolle gespielt. Dabei dienen sie – sei es als reine Folge von Bildern, sei es mit Text oder gar nur als Text – aber meistens nur als eine Art Vorlage für die Sprachproduktion der Kinder: Sie sollen aus der Vorlage eine Geschichte ableiten und in ihren eigenen Worten erzählen. Das bekannteste, aber keineswegs das einzige Beispiel sind die von Michael Bamberg, Ruth Berman und Dan Slobin in den 1980er Jahren initiierten „frog stories” – Nacherzählungen einer einfachen Bildgeschichte, die inzwischen in zahlreichen Sprachen vorliegen und viele Aufschlüsse über die unterschiedlichsten Aspekte der sich entwickelnden Sprachbeherrschung, von der Flexionsmorphologie bis zur Textstruktur, gebracht haben. Das ist gut und sinnvoll; aber im Grunde müsste man einen Schritt weiter gehen, nämlich gleichsam wir durch ein Mikroskop zu schauen, wie sich die Kinder ihre Regularitäten aus der Interaktion ableiten. Dies würde unsere Vorstellungen über den Verlauf des Spracherwerbs und die Gesetzlichkeiten, nach denen er erfolgt, wesentlich bereichern, vielleicht auf eine ganz neue Basis stellen. Die Beiträge dieses Heftes geben dafür eine Reihe von Beispielen, von denen nur ein kleines, aber besonders schlagendes erwähnt werden soll. Es gibt zahlreiche, auf Bildgeschichten beruhende Analysen, in denen untersucht wird, wie Kinder eine bestimmte Person oder eine Sache im fortlaufenden Diskurs benennen – ob sie etwa definite und indefinite Nominalausdrücke (ein Junge – der Junge), lexikalische oder pronominale Nominalphrasen (der Junge – er) oder gar leere Elemente (der Junge wacht auf und 0 schaut nach seinem Hund) richtig verwenden können. Das Bild, das die Forschung in diesem wesentlichen Teil der Sprachbeherrschung heute bietet, ist alles andere als einheitlich. So umfassen die Ansichten darüber, wann die Definit-Indefinit-Unterscheidung gemeistert wird, den größten Teil der Kindheit, je nachdem, welche Untersuchungen man zu Rate zieht. In dem Aufsatz von Katrin Dammann-Thedens wird deutlich, dass Kindern in einem bestimmen Alter oft überhaupt nicht klar ist, dass eine bestimmte Person, eine bestimmte Sache auf fortlaufenden Bildern dieselbe ist – auch wenn sie ähnlich aussieht –, und das ist bei Licht besehen ja auch keine triviale Frage. Diese Beobachtungen werfen ein ganz neues Licht auf die Idee der referentiellen Kontinuität im Diskurs und ihren Ausdruck durch nominale Ausdrücke wie die eben genannten. Vielleicht haben wir ganz falsche Vorstellungen darüber, wie Kinder die begleitende Information – hier durch die Bilder einer Geschichte geliefert – verstehen und damit für den Spracherwerb verarbeiten. Derlei Beobachtungen sind zunächst einmal etwas Punktuelles, keine Antworten, sondern Hinweise auf Dinge, die man bedenken muss. Aber ihre Analyse, und allgemeiner, ein genauerer Blick auf das, was sich tatsächlich abspielt, wenn Kinder sich Kinderbücher anschauen, mag uns vielleicht zu einem wesentlich tieferen Verständnis dessen führen, was beim Erwerb einer Sprache tatsächlich geschieht.