Publications

Abstract

Both adults and adolescents often conform their behavior and opinions to peer groups, even when they themselves know better. The current study investigated this phenomenon in 24 groups of 4 children between 4;2 and 4;9 years of age. Children often made their judgments conform to those of 3 peers, who had made obviously erroneous but unanimous public judgments right before them. A follow-up study with 18 groups of 4 children between 4;0 and 4;6 years of age revealed that children did not change their “real” judgment of the situation, but only their public expression of it. Preschool children are subject to peer pressure, indicating sensitivity to peers as a primary social reference group already during the preschool years.

Abstract

Cross-culturally, the human mind varies more than we generally assume

Abstract

Despite the global universality of physical space, different cultural groups vary substantially as to how they memorize it. Although European participants mostly prefer egocentric strategies (“left, right, front, back”) to memorize spatial relations, others use mostly allocentric strategies (“north, south, east, west”). Prior research has shown that some cultures show a general preference to memorize object locations and even also body movements in relation to the larger environment rather than in relation to their own body. Here, we investigate whether this cultural bias also applies to movements specifically directed at the participants' own body, emphasizing the role of ego. We show that even participants with generally allocentric biases preferentially memorize self-directed movements using egocentric spatial strategies. These results demonstrate an intricate system of interacting cultural biases and momentary situational characteristics.

Abstract

We investigate decision-making behaviour in all four non-human great ape species. Apes chose between a safe and a risky option across trials of varying expected values. All species chose the safe option more often with decreasing probability of success. While all species were risk-seeking, orangutans and chimpanzees chose the risky option more often than gorillas and bonobos. Hence all four species' preferences were ordered in a manner consistent with normative dictates of expected value, but varied predictably in their willingness to take risks.

Abstract

Contemporary comparative cognition has a large repertoire of animal models and methods, with concurrent theoretical advances that are providing initial answers to crucial questions about human cognition. What cognitive traits are uniquely human? What are the species-typical inherited predispositions of the human mind? What is the human mind capable of without certain types of specific experiences with the surrounding environment? Here, we review recent findings from the domains of space, time and number cognition. These findings are produced using different comparative methodologies relying on different animal species, namely birds and non-human great apes. The study of these species not only reveals the range of cognitive abilities across vertebrates, but also increases our understanding of human cognition in crucial ways.

Abstract

The present paper explores cross-cultural variation in spatial cognition by comparing spatial reconstruction tasks by Dutch and Namibian elementary school children. These two communities differ in the way they predominantly express spatial relations in language. Four experiments investigate cognitive strategy preferences across different levels of task-complexity and instruction. Data show a correlation between dominant linguistic spatial frames of reference and performance patterns in non-linguistic spatial memory tasks. This correlation is shown to be stable across an increase of complexity in the spatial array. When instructed to use their respective non-habitual cognitive strategy, participants were not easily able to switch between strategies and their attempts to do so impaired their performance. These results indicate a difference not only in preference but also in competence and suggest that spatial language and non-linguistic preferences and competences in spatial cognition are systematically aligned across human populations.

Abstract

Recent work demonstrates that learning to understand noise-vocoded (NV) speech alters sublexical perceptual processes but is enhanced by the simultaneous provision of higher-level, phonological, but not lexical content (Hervais-Adelman, Davis, Johnsrude, & Carlyon, 2008), consistent with top-down learning (Davis, Johnsrude, Hervais-Adelman, Taylor, & McGettigan, 2005; Hervais-Adelman et al., 2008). Here, we investigate whether training listeners with specific types of NV speech improves intelligibility of vocoded speech with different acoustic characteristics. Transfer of perceptual learning would provide evidence for abstraction from variable properties of the speech input. In Experiment 1, we demonstrate that learning of NV speech in one frequency region generalizes to an untrained frequency region. In Experiment 2, we assessed generalization among three carrier signals used to create NV speech: noise bands, pulse trains, and sine waves. Stimuli created using these three carriers possess the same slow, time-varying amplitude information and are equated for naive intelligibility but differ in their temporal fine structure. Perceptual learning generalized partially, but not completely, among different carrier signals. These results delimit the functional and neural locus of perceptual learning of vocoded speech. Generalization across frequency regions suggests that learning occurs at a stage of processing at which some abstraction from the physical signal has occurred, while incomplete transfer across carriers indicates that learning occurs at a stage of processing that is sensitive to acoustic features critical for speech perception (e.g., noise, periodicity).

Abstract

In this review we will focus on delineating the neural substrates of the executive control of language in the bilingual brain, based on the existing neuroimaging, intracranial, transcranial magnetic stimulation, and neuropsychological evidence. We will also offer insights from ongoing brain-imaging studies into the development of expertise in multilingual language control. We will concentrate specifically on evidence regarding how the brain selects and controls languages for comprehension and production. This question has been addressed in a number of ways and using various tasks, including language switching during production or perception, translation, and interpretation. We will attempt to synthesize existing evidence in order to bring to light the neural substrates that are crucial to executive control of language.

Abstract

Imagine describing the particular characteristics of the hue of a flower, or the quality of its scent, or the texture of its petal. Introspection suggests the expression of such sensory experiences in words is something quite different than the task of naming artifacts. The particular challenges in the linguistic encoding of sensorial experiences pose questions regarding how languages manage semantic gaps and “ineffability.” That is, what strategies do speakers have available to manage phenomena or domains of experience that are inexpressible or difficult to express in their language? This article considers this issue with regard to color in Umpila, an Aboriginal Australian language of the Paman family. The investigation of color naming and ineffability in Umpila reveals rich associations and mappings between color and visual perceptual qualities more generally, categorization of the human social world, and the environment. “Gaps” in the color system are filled or supported by associations with two of the most linguistically and culturally salient domains for Umpila - kinship and the environment

Abstract

Mimicry has been observed regarding a range of nonverbal behaviors, but only recently have researchers started to investigate mimicry in co-speech gestures. These gestures are considered to be crucially different from other aspects of nonverbal behavior due to their tight link with speech. This study provides evidence of mimicry in co-speech gestures in face-to-face dialogue, the most common forum of everyday talk. In addition, it offers an analysis of the functions that mimicked co-speech gestures fulfill in the collaborative process of creating a mutually shared understanding of referring expressions. The implications bear on theories of gesture production, research on grounding, and the mechanisms underlying behavioral mimicry.

Abstract

This study uses a classical referential communication task to
investigate the role of co-speech gestures in the process of
coordination. The study manipulates both the common ground between the interlocutors, as well as the visibility of the gestures they use. The findings show that co-speech gestures are an integral part of the referential utterances speakers
produced with regard to both initial references as well as repeated references, and that the availability of gestures appears to impact on interlocutors’ referential oordination. The results are discussed with regard to past research on
common ground as well as theories of gesture production.

Abstract

There is evidence that co-speech gestures communicate information to addressees and that they are often communicatively intended. However, we still know comparatively little about the role of gestures in the actual process of communication. The present study offers a systematic investigation of speakers’ gesture use before and after addressee feedback. The findings show that when speakers responded to addressees’ feedback gesture rate remained constant when this feedback encouraged clarification, elaboration or correction. However, speakers gestured proportionally less often after feedback when providing confirmatory responses. That is, speakers may not be drawing on gesture in response to addressee feedback per se, but particularly with responses that enhance addressees’ understanding. Further, the large majority of speakers’ gestures changed in their form. They tended to be more precise, larger, or more visually prominent after feedback. Some changes in gesture viewpoint were also observed. In addition, we found that speakers used deixis in speech and gaze to increase the salience of gestures occurring in response to feedback. Speakers appear to conceive of gesture as a useful modality in redesigning utterances to make them more accessible to addressees. The findings further our understanding of recipient design and co-speech gestures in face-to-face dialogue.
Highlights

► Gesture rate remains constant in response to addressee feedback when the response aims to correct or clarify understanding. ► But gesture rate decreases when speakers provide confirmatory responses to feedback signalling correct understanding. ► Gestures are more communicative in response to addressee feedback, particularly in terms of precision, size and visual prominence. ► Speakers make gestures in response to addressee feedback more salient by using deictic markers in speech and gaze.

Abstract

This paper describes a computerized alternative to glottochronology for estimating elapsed time since parent languages diverged into daughter languages. The method, developed by the Automated Similarity Judgment Program (ASJP) consortium, is different from glottochronology in four major respects: (1) it is automated and thus is more objective, (2) it applies a uniform analytical approach to a single database of worldwide languages, (3) it is based on lexical similarity as determined from Levenshtein (edit) distances rather than on cognate percentages, and (4) it provides a formula for date calculation that mathematically recognizes the lexical heterogeneity of individual languages, including parent languages just before their breakup into daughter languages. Automated judgments of lexical similarity for groups of related languages are calibrated with historical, epigraphic, and archaeological divergence dates for 52 language groups. The discrepancies between estimated and calibration dates are found to be on average 29% as large as the estimated dates themselves, a figure that does not differ significantly among language families. As a resource for further research that may require dates of known level of accuracy, we offer a list of ASJP time depths for nearly all the world’s recognized language families and for many subfamilies.

Abstract

Objective: Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is a highly heritable disorder. The NOS1 gene encoding nitric oxide synthase is a candidate gene for ADHD and has been previously linked with impulsivity. In the present study, the authors investigated the effect of a functional variable number of tandem repeats (VNTR) polymorphism in NOS1 (NOS1 exon 1f-VNTR) on the processing of rewards, one of the cognitive deficits in ADHD. Method: A sample of 136 participants, consisting of 87 adult ADHD patients and 49 healthy comparison subjects, completed a reward-related impulsivity task. A total of 104 participants also underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging during a reward anticipation task. The effect of the NOS1 exon 1f-VNTR genotype on reward-related impulsivity and reward-related ventral striatal activity was examined. Results: ADHD patients had higher impulsivity scores and lower ventral striatal activity than healthy comparison subjects. The association between the short allele and increased impulsivity was confirmed. However, independent of disease status, homozygous carriers of the short allele of NOS1, the ADHD risk genotype, demonstrated higher ventral striatal activity than carriers of the other NOS1 VNTR genotypes. Conclusions: The authors suggest that the NOS1 genotype influences impulsivity and its relation with ADHD is mediated through effects on this behavioral trait. Increased ventral striatal activity related to NOS1 may be compensatory for effects in other brain regions.

Abstract

We investigated reasoning about spatial relational similarity in three great ape species: chimpanzees, bonobos, and orangutans. Apes were presented with three spatial mapping tasks in which they were required to find a reward in an array of three cups, after observing a reward being hidden in a different array of three cups. To obtain a food reward, apes needed to choose the cup that was in the same relative position (i.e., on the left) as the baited cup in the other array. The three tasks differed in the constellation of the two arrays. In Experiment 1, the arrays were placed next to each other, forming a line. In Experiment 2, the positioning of the two arrays varied each trial, being placed either one behind the other in two rows, or next to each other, forming a line. Finally, in Experiment 3, the two arrays were always positioned one behind the other in two rows, but misaligned. Results suggested that apes compared the two arrays and recognized that they were similar in some way. However, we believe that instead of mapping the left–left, middle–middle, and right–right cups from each array, they mapped the cups that shared the most similar relations to nearby landmarks (table’s visual boundaries).

Abstract

Four eye-tracking experiments examined whether semantic and visual-shape representations are routinely retrieved from printed-word displays and used during language-mediated visual search. Participants listened to sentences containing target words which were similar semantically or in shape to concepts invoked by concurrently-displayed printed words. In Experiment 1 the displays contained semantic and shape competitors of the targets, and two unrelated words. There were significant shifts in eye gaze as targets were heard towards semantic but not shape competitors. In Experiments 2-4, semantic competitors were replaced with unrelated words, semantically richer sentences were presented to encourage visual imagery, or participants rated the shape similarity of the stimuli before doing the eye-tracking task. In all cases there were no immediate shifts in eye gaze to shape competitors, even though, in response to the Experiment 1 spoken materials, participants looked to these competitors when they were presented as pictures (Huettig & McQueen, 2007). There was a late shape-competitor bias (more than 2500 ms after target onset) in all experiments. These data show that shape information is not used in online search of printed-word displays (whereas it is used with picture displays). The nature of the visual environment appears to induce implicit biases towards particular modes of processing during language-mediated visual search.

Abstract

We describe the key features of the visual world paradigm and review the main research areas where it has been used. In our discussion we highlight that the paradigm provides information about the way language users integrate linguistic information with information derived from the visual environment. Therefore the paradigm is well suited to study one of the key issues of current cognitive psychology, namely the interplay between linguistic and visual information processing. However, conclusions about linguistic processing (e.g., about activation, competition, and timing of access of linguistic representations) in the absence of relevant visual information must be drawn with caution.

Abstract

Three eye-tracking experiments investigated the influence of stored colour knowledge, perceived surface colour, and conceptual category of visual objects on language-mediated overt attention. Participants heard spoken target words whose concepts are associated with a diagnostic colour (e.g., "spinach"; spinach is typically green) while their eye movements were monitored to (a) objects associated with a diagnostic colour but presented in black and white (e.g., a black-and-white line drawing of a frog), (b) objects associated with a diagnostic colour but presented in an appropriate but atypical colour (e.g., a colour photograph of a yellow frog), and (c) objects not associated with a diagnostic colour but presented in the diagnostic colour of the target concept (e.g., a green blouse; blouses are not typically green). We observed that colour-mediated shifts in overt attention are primarily due to the perceived surface attributes of the visual objects rather than stored knowledge about the typical colour of the object. In addition our data reveal that conceptual category information is the primary determinant of overt attention if both conceptual category and surface colour competitors are copresent in the visual environment.

Abstract

In the visual world paradigm as used in psycholinguistics, eye gaze (i.e. visual orienting) is measured in order to draw conclusions about linguistic processing. However, current theories are underspecified with respect to how visual attention is guided on the basis of linguistic representations. In the visual search paradigm as used within the area of visual attention research, investigators have become more and more interested in how visual orienting is affected by higher order representations, such as those involved in memory and language. Within this area more specific models of orienting on the basis of visual information exist, but they need to be extended with mechanisms that allow for language-mediated orienting. In the present paper we review the evidence from these two different – but highly related – research areas. We arrive at a model in which working memory serves as the nexus in which long-term visual as well as linguistic representations (i.e. types) are bound to specific locations (i.e. tokens or indices). The model predicts that the interaction between language and visual attention is subject to a number of conditions, such as the presence of the guiding representation in working memory, capacity limitations, and cognitive control mechanisms.

Abstract

The influence of formal literacy on spoken language-mediated visual orienting was investigated by using a simple look and listen task (cf. Huettig & Altmann, 2005) which resembles every day behavior. In Experiment 1, high and low literates listened to spoken sentences containing a target word (e.g., 'magar', crocodile) while at the same time looking at a visual display of four objects (a phonological competitor of the target word, e.g., 'matar', peas; a semantic competitor, e.g., 'kachuwa', turtle, and two unrelated distractors). In Experiment 2 the semantic competitor was replaced with another unrelated distractor. Both groups of participants shifted their eye gaze to the semantic competitors (Experiment 1). In both experiments high literates shifted their eye gaze towards phonological competitors as soon as phonological information became available and moved their eyes away as soon as the acoustic information mismatched. Low literates in contrast only used phonological information when semantic matches between spoken word and visual referent were impossible (Experiment 2) but in contrast to high literates these phonologically-mediated shifts in eye gaze were not closely time-locked to the speech input. We conclude that in high literates language-mediated shifts in overt attention are co-determined by the type of information in the visual environment, the timing of cascaded processing in the word- and object-recognition systems, and the temporal unfolding of the spoken language. Our findings indicate that low literates exhibit a similar cognitive behavior but instead of participating in a tug-of-war among multiple types of cognitive representations, word-object mapping is achieved primarily at the semantic level. If forced, for instance by a situation in which semantic matches are not present (Experiment 2), low literates may on occasion have to rely on phonological information but do so in a much less proficient manner than their highly literate counterparts.

Abstract

The current chapter discusses a structural priming experiment that investigated the on-line processing of English subject- and object- relative clauses. Sixty-one monolingual English-speaking adults participated in a self-paced reading experiment where they read prime-target pairs that fully crossed the relativised element within the relative clause (subject- versus object) across prime and target sentences. Following probabilistic theories of sentence processing, which predict that low frequency structures like object relatives are subject to greater priming effects due to their marked status, it was hypothesised that the normally-observed subject RC processing advantage would be eliminated following priming. The hypothesis was supported, identifying an important role for structural frequency in the processing of relative clause structures.

Abstract

In the first decade of neurocognitive word production research the predominant approach was brain mapping, i.e., investigating the regional cerebral brain activation patterns correlated with word production tasks, such as picture naming and word generation. Indefrey and Levelt (2004) conducted a comprehensive meta-analysis of word production studies that used this approach and combined the resulting spatial information on neural correlates of component processes of word production with information on the time course of word production provided by behavioral and electromagnetic studies. In recent years, neurocognitive word production research has seen a major change toward a hypothesis-testing approach. This approach is characterized by the design of experimental variables modulating single component processes of word production and testing for predicted effects on spatial or temporal neurocognitive signatures of these components. This change was accompanied by the development of a broader spectrum of measurement and analysis techniques. The article reviews the findings of recent studies using the new approach. The time course assumptions of Indefrey and Levelt (2004) have largely been confirmed requiring only minor adaptations. Adaptations of the brain structure/function relationships proposed by Indefrey and Leven (2004) include the precise role of subregions of the left inferior frontal gyrus as well as a probable, yet to date unclear role of the inferior parietal cortex in word production.

Abstract

Deletions and reciprocal duplications of the chromosome 16p13.1 region have recently been reported in several cases of autism and mental retardation (MR). As genomic copy number variants found in these two disorders may also associate with schizophrenia, we examined 4345 schizophrenia patients and 35 079 controls from 8 European populations for duplications and deletions at the 16p13.1 locus, using microarray data. We found a threefold excess of duplications and deletions in schizophrenia cases compared with controls, with duplications present in 0.30% of cases versus 0.09% of controls (P=0.007) and deletions in 0.12 % of cases and 0.04% of controls (P>0.05). The region can be divided into three intervals defined by flanking low copy repeats. Duplications spanning intervals I and II showed the most significant (P=0.00010) association with schizophrenia. The age of onset in duplication and deletion carriers among cases ranged from 12 to 35 years, and the majority were males with a family history of psychiatric disorders. In a single Icelandic family, a duplication spanning intervals I and II was present in two cases of schizophrenia, and individual cases of alcoholism, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and dyslexia. Candidate genes in the region include NTAN1 and NDE1. We conclude that duplications and perhaps also deletions of chromosome 16p13.1, previously reported to be associated with autism and MR, also confer risk of schizophrenia.

Abstract

In this study we investigate whether speakers, in line with the predictions of the Hyper- and Hypospeech theory, speed up most during the least informative parts and less during the more informative parts, when they are asked to speak faster. We expected listeners to benefit from these changes in timing, and our main goal was to find out whether making the temporal organisation of artificially time-compressed speech more like that of natural fast speech would improve intelligibility over linear time compression. Our production study showed that speakers reduce unstressed syllables more than stressed syllables, thereby making the prosodic pattern more pronounced. We extrapolated fast speech timing to even faster rates because we expected that the more salient prosodic pattern could be exploited in difficult listening situations. However, at very fast speech rates, applying fast speech timing worsens intelligibility. We argue that the non-uniform way of speeding up may not be due to an underlying communicative principle, but may result from speakers’ inability to speed up otherwise. As both prosodic and segmental information contribute to word recognition, we conclude that extrapolating fast speech timing to extremely fast rates distorts this balance between prosodic and segmental information.

Abstract

A. Caramazza, A. Costa, M. Miozzo, and Y. Bi(2001) reported a series of experiments demonstrating that the ease of producing a word depends only on the frequency of that specific word but not on the frequency of a homophone twin. A. Caramazza, A. Costa, et al. concluded that homophones have separate word form representations and that the absence of frequency-inheritance effects for homophones undermines an important argument in support of 2-stage models of lexical access, which assume that syntactic (lemma) representations mediate between conceptual and phonological representations. The authors of this article evaluate the empirical basis of this conclusion, report 2 experiments demonstrating a frequency-inheritance effect, and discuss other recent evidence. It is concluded that homophones share a common word form and that the distinction between lemmas and word forms should be upheld.

Abstract

We investigated whether seeing a pointing gesture influences the perceived lexical stress. A pitch contour continuum between the Dutch words “CAnon” (‘canon’) and “kaNON” (‘cannon’) was presented along with a pointing gesture during the first or the second syllable. Pointing gestures following natural recordings but not Gaussian functions influenced stress perception (Experiment 1 and 2), especially when auditory context preceded (Experiment 2). This was not replicated in Experiment 3. Natural pointing gestures failed to affect the categorization of a pitch peak timing continuum (Experiment 4). There is thus no convincing evidence that seeing a pointing gesture influences lexical stress perception.

Abstract

Listeners use lexical knowledge to adjust to speakers’ idiosyncratic pronunciations. Dutch listeners learn to interpret an ambiguous sound between /s/ and /f/ as /f/ if they hear it word-finally in Dutch words normally ending in /f/, but as /s/ if they hear it in normally /s/-final words. Here, we examined two positional effects in lexically guided retuning. In Experiment 1, ambiguous sounds during exposure always appeared in word-initial position (replacing the first sounds of /f/- or /s/-initial words). No retuning was found. In Experiment 2, the same ambiguous sounds always appeared word-finally during exposure. Here, retuning was found. Lexically guided perceptual learning thus appears to emerge reliably only when lexical knowledge is available as the to-be-tuned segment is initially being processed. Under these conditions, however, lexically guided retuning was position independent: It generalized across syllabic positions. Lexical retuning can thus benefit future recognition of particular sounds wherever they appear in words.

Abstract

Eye movements made by listeners during language-mediated visual search reveal a strong link between
visual processing and conceptual processing. For example, upon hearing the word for a missing referent
with a characteristic colour (e.g., “strawberry”), listeners tend to fixate a colour-matched distractor (e.g.,
a red plane) more than a colour-mismatched distractor (e.g., a yellow plane). We ask whether these
shifts in visual attention are mediated by the retrieval of lexically stored colour labels. Do children
who do not yet possess verbal labels for the colour attribute that spoken and viewed objects have in
common exhibit language-mediated eye movements like those made by older children and adults?
That is, do toddlers look at a red plane when hearing “strawberry”? We observed that 24-montholds
lacking colour term knowledge nonetheless recognized the perceptual–conceptual commonality
between named and seen objects. This indicates that language-mediated visual search need not
depend on stored labels for concepts.

Abstract

The nature of children’s early lexical processing was investigated by asking what information 36-month-olds access and use when instructed to find a known but absent referent. Children readily retrieved stored knowledge about characteristic color, i.e. when asked to find an object with a typical color (e.g. strawberry), children tended to fixate more upon an object that had the same (e.g. red plane) as opposed to a different (e.g. yellow plane) color. They did so regardless of the fact that they have had plenty of time to recognize the pictures for what they are, i.e. planes not strawberries. These data represent the first demonstration that language-mediated shifts of overt attention in young children can be driven by individual stored visual attributes of known words that mismatch on most other dimensions. The finding suggests that lexical processing and overt attention are strongly linked from an early age.

Abstract

The Possible Word Constraint limits the number of lexical candidates considered in speech recognition by stipulating that input should be parsed into a string of lexically viable chunks. For instance, an isolated single consonant is not a feasible word candidate. Any segmentation containing such a chunk is disfavored. Five experiments using the head-turn preference procedure investigated whether, like adults, 12-month-olds observe this constraint in word recognition. In Experiments 1 and 2, infants were familiarized with target words (e.g., rush), then tested on lists of nonsense items containing these words in “possible” (e.g., “niprush” [nip + rush]) or “impossible” positions (e.g., “prush” [p + rush]). The infants listened significantly longer to targets in “possible” versus “impossible” contexts when targets occurred at the end of nonsense items (rush in “prush”), but not when they occurred at the beginning (tan in “tance”). In Experiments 3 and 4, 12-month-olds were similarly familiarized with target words, but test items were real words in sentential contexts (win in “wind” versus “window”). The infants listened significantly longer to words in the “possible” condition regardless of target location. Experiment 5 with targets at the beginning of isolated real words (e.g., win in “wind”) replicated Experiment 2 in showing no evidence of viability effects in beginning position. Taken together, the findings suggest that, in situations in which 12-month-olds are required to rely on their word segmentation abilities, they give evidence of observing lexical viability constraints in the way that they parse fluent speech.

Abstract

Studies exploring the role of neural oscillations in cognition have revealed sustained increases in alpha-band (∼8–14 Hz) power during the delay period of delayed-recognition short-term memory tasks. These increases have been proposed to reflect the inhibition, for example, of cortical areas representing task-irrelevant information, or of potentially interfering representations from previous trials. Another possibility, however, is that elevated delay-period alpha-band power (DPABP) reflects the selection and maintenance of information, rather than, or in addition to, the inhibition of task-irrelevant information. In the present study, we explored these possibilities using a delayed-recognition paradigm in which the presence and task relevance of shape information was systematically manipulated across trial blocks and electroencephalographic was used to measure alpha-band power. In the first trial block, participants remembered locations marked by identical black circles. The second block featured the same instructions, but locations were marked by unique shapes. The third block featured the same stimulus presentation as the second, but with pretrial instructions indicating, on a trial-by-trial basis, whether memory for shape or location was required, the other dimension being irrelevant. In the final block, participants remembered the unique pairing of shape and location for each stimulus. Results revealed minimal DPABP in each of the location-memory conditions, whether locations were marked with identical circles or with unique task-irrelevant shapes. In contrast, alpha-band power increases were observed in both the shape-memory condition, in which location was task irrelevant, and in the critical final condition, in which both shape and location were task relevant. These results provide support for the proposal that alpha-band oscillations reflect the retention of shape information and/or shape–location associations in short-term memory.

Abstract

A visual fixation study tested whether seven-month-olds can discriminate between different talkers. The infants were first habituated to talkers producing sentences in either a familiar or unfamiliar language, then heard test sentences from previously unheard speakers, either in the language used for habituation, or in another language. When the language at test mismatched that in habituation, infants always noticed the change. When language remained constant and only talker altered, however, infants detected the change only if the language was the native tongue. Adult listeners with a different native tongue than the infants did not reproduce the discriminability patterns shown by the infants, and infants detected neither voice nor language changes in reversed speech; both these results argue against explanation of the native-language voice discrimination in terms of acoustic properties of the stimuli. The ability to identify talkers is, like many other perceptual abilities, strongly influenced by early life experience.

Abstract

Background: Autism spectrum disorders (ASD) are characterised by social and communication difficulties in day-to-day life, including problems in recognising emotions. However, experimental investigations of emotion recognition ability in ASD have been equivocal; hampered by small sample sizes, narrow IQ range and over-focus on the visual modality. Methods: We tested 99 adolescents (mean age 15;6 years, mean IQ 85) with an ASD and 57 adolescents without an ASD (mean age 15;6 years, mean IQ 88) on a facial emotion recognition task and two vocal emotion recognition tasks (one verbal; one non-verbal). Recognition of happiness, sadness, fear, anger, surprise and disgust were tested. Using structural equation modelling, we conceptualised emotion recognition ability as a multimodal construct, measured by the three tasks. We examined how the mean levels of recognition of the six emotions differed by group (ASD vs. non-ASD) and IQ (>= 80 vs. < 80). Results: There was no significant difference between groups for the majority of emotions and analysis of error patterns suggested that the ASD group were vulnerable to the same pattern of confusions between emotions as the non-ASD group. However, recognition ability was significantly impaired in the ASD group for surprise. IQ had a strong and significant effect on performance for the recognition of all six emotions, with higher IQ adolescents outperforming lower IQ adolescents. Conclusions: The findings do not suggest a fundamental difficulty with the recognition of basic emotions in adolescents with ASD.

Abstract

Social structure in human societies is underpinned by the variable expression of ideas about relatedness between different types of kin. We express these ideas through language in our kin terminology: to delineate who is kin and who is not, and to attach meanings to the types of kin labels associated with different individuals. Cross-culturally, there is a regular and restricted range of patterned variation in kin terminologies, and to date, our understanding of this diversity has been hampered by inadequate techniques for dealing with the hierarchical relatedness of languages (Galton’s Problem). Here I use maximum-likelihood and Bayesian phylogenetic comparative methods to begin to tease apart the processes underlying the evolution of kin terminologies in the Austronesian language family, focusing on terms for siblings. I infer (1) the probable ancestral states and (2) evolutionary models of change for the semantic distinctions of relative age (older/younger sibling) and relative sex (same sex/opposite-sex). Analyses show that early Austronesian languages contained the relative-age, but not the relative-sex distinction; the latter was reconstructed firmly only for the ancestor of Eastern Malayo-Polynesian languages. Both distinctions were best characterized by evolutionary models where the gains and losses of the semantic distinctions were equally likely. A multi-state model of change examined how the relative-sex distinction could be elaborated and found that some transitions in kin terms were not possible: jumps from absence to heavily elaborated were very unlikely, as was piece-wise dismantling of elaborate distinctions. Cultural ideas about what types of kin distinctions are important can be embedded in the semantics of language; using a phylogenetic evolutionary framework we can understand how those distinctions in meaning change through time.

Abstract

Baby's begrijpen woorden eerder dan dat ze deze zeggen. Dit stadium is onderbelicht want moeilijk waarneembaar. Caroline Junge onderzocht de vaardigheden die nodig zijn voor het leren van de eerste woordjes: conceptherkenning, woordherkenning en het verbinden van woord aan betekenis. Daarvoor bestudeerde ze de hersenpotentialen van het babybrein tijdens het horen van woordjes. Junge stelt vast dat baby's van negen maanden al woordbegrip hebben. En dat is veel vroeger dan tot nu toe bekend was. Als baby's een woord hoorde dat niet klopte met het plaatje dat ze zagen, lieten ze een N400-effect zien, een klassiek hersenpotentiaal. Uit eerder Duits onderzoek is gebleken dat baby's van twaalf maanden dit effect nog niet laten zien, omdat de hersenen nog niet rijp zouden zijn. Het onderzoek van Junge weerlegt dit. Ook laat ze zien dat als baby's goed woorden kunnen herkennen binnen zinnetjes, dit belangrijk is voor hun latere taalontwikkeling, wat mogelijk tot nieuwe therapieën voor taalstoornissen zal leiden.

Abstract

Theorists of language have argued that co-­speech hand gestures are an
intentional part of social communication. The present study provides evidence for these
claims by showing that speakers adjust their gesture use according to their perceived relevance to the audience. Participants were asked to read about items that were and were not useful in a wilderness survival scenario, under the pretense that they would then
explain (on camera) what they learned to one of two different audiences. For one audience (a group of college students in a dormitory orientation activity), the stakes of successful
communication were low;; for the other audience (a group of students preparing for a
rugged camping trip in the mountains), the stakes were high. In their explanations to the camera, participants in the high stakes condition produced three times as many
representational gestures, and spent three times as much time gesturing, than participants in the low stakes condition. This study extends previous research by showing that the anticipated consequences of one’s communication—namely, the degree to which information may be useful to an intended recipient—influences speakers’ use of gesture.

Abstract

When you compare the behavior of two different age groups which are trying to master the same sensori-motor or cognitive skill, you are likely to discover varying learning routes: different stages, different intervals between stages, or even different orderings of stages. Such heterogeneous learning trajectories may be caused by at least six different types of factors: (1) Initial state: the kinds and levels of skills the learners have available at the onset of the learning episode. (2) Learning mechanisms: rule-based, inductive, connectionist, parameter setting, and so on. (3) Input and feedback characteristics: learning stimuli, information about success and failure. (4) Information processing mechanisms: capacity limitations, attentional biases, response preferences. (5) Energetic variables: motivation, emotional reactions. (6) Final state: the fine-structure of kinds and levels of subskills at the end of the learning episode. This applies to language acquisition as well. First and second language learners probably differ on all six factors. Nevertheless, the debate between advocates and opponents of the Fundamental Difference Hypothesis concerning L1 and L2 acquisition have looked almost exclusively at the first two factors. Those who believe that L1 learners have access to Universal Grammar whereas L2 learners rely on language processing strategies, postulate different learning mechanisms (UG parameter setting in L1, more general inductive strategies in L2 learning). Pienemann opposes this view and, based on his Processability Theory, argues that L1 and L2 learners start out from different initial states: they come to the grammar learning task with different structural hypotheses (SOV versus SVO as basic word order of German).

Abstract

In a recent Cognition paper (Cognition 85 (2002) B21), Bornkessel, Schlesewsky, and Friederici report ERP data that they claim “show that online processing difficulties induced by word order variations in German cannot be attributed to the relative infrequency of the constructions in question, but rather appear to reflect the application of grammatical principles during parsing” (p. B21). In this commentary we demonstrate that the posited contrast between grammatical principles and construction (in)frequency as sources of parsing problems is artificial because it is based on factually incorrect assumptions about the grammar of German and on inaccurate corpus frequency data concerning the German constructions involved.

Abstract

In this paper we report on a visual world eye-tracking experiment that investigated the differing abilities of adults and children to use referential scene information during reanalysis to overcome lexical biases during sentence processing. The results showed that adults incorporated aspects of the referential scene into their parse as soon as it became apparent that a test sentence was syntactically ambiguous, suggesting they considered the two alternative analyses in parallel. In contrast, the children appeared not to reanalyze their initial analysis, even over shorter distances than have been investigated in prior research. We argue that this reflects the children's over-reliance on bottom-up, lexical cues to interpretation. The implications for the development of parsing routines are discussed

Abstract

This paper considers the use and representation of Australian hypocoristics (e.g., choccie → chocolate, arvo → afternoon). One-hundred-and-fifteen adult speakers of Australian English aged 17–84 years generated as many tokens of hypocoristics as they could in 10 min. The resulting corpus was analysed along a number of dimensions in an attempt to identify (i) general age- and gender-related trends in hypocoristic knowledge and use, and (ii) linguistic properties of each hypocoristic class. Following Bybee’s (1985, 1995) lexical network approach, we conclude that Australian hypocoristics are the product of the same linguistic processes that capture other inflectional morphological processes.

Abstract

The present paper reports on a study that investigated the role of procedural and declarative memory in the acquisition of Finnish past tense morphology. Two competing models were tested. Ullman's (2004) declarative/procedural model predicts that procedural memory supports the acquisition of regular morphology, whereas declarative memory supports the acquisition of irregular morphology. In contrast, single-route approaches predict that declarative memory should support lexical learning, which in turn should predict morphological acquisition. One-hundred and twenty-four (N=124) monolingual Finnish-speaking children aged 4;0–6;7 completed tests of procedural and declarative memory, tests of vocabulary knowledge and nonverbal ability, and a test of past test knowledge. The results best supported the single-route approach, suggesting that this account best extends to languages that possess greater morphological complexity than English.

Abstract

Eisenberg (2002) presents data from an experiment investigating three- and four-year-old children's comprehension of restrictive relative clauses (RC). From the results she argues, contrary to Hamburger & Crain (1982), that children do not have discourse knowledge of the felicity conditions of RCs before acquiring the syntax of relativization. This note evaluates this conclusion on the basis of the methodology used, and proposes that an account of syntactic development needs to be sensitive to the real-time processing requirements acquisition places on the learner.

Abstract

Gestures that spontaneously accompany speech convey information coordinated with the concurrent speech. There has been considerable theoretical disagreement about the process by which this informational coordination is achieved. Some theories predict that the information encoded in gesture is not influenced by how information is verbally expressed. However, others predict that gestures encode only what is encoded in speech. This paper investigates this issue by comparing informational coordination between speech and gesture across different languages. Narratives in Turkish, Japanese, and English were elicited using an animated cartoon as the stimulus. It was found that gestures used to express the same motion events were influenced simultaneously by (1) how features of motion events were expressed in each language, and (2) spatial information in the stimulus that was never verbalized. From this, it is concluded that gestures are generated from spatio-motoric processes that interact on-line with the speech production process. Through the interaction, spatio-motoric information to be expressed is packaged into chunks that are verbalizable within a processing unit for speech formulation. In addition, we propose a model of speech and gesture production as one of a class of frameworks that are compatible with the data.

Abstract

The previous literature has suggested that the hand movement in co-speech gestures and signs consists of a series of phases with qualitatively different dynamic characteristics. In this paper, we propose a syntagmatic rule system for movement phases that applies to both co-speech gestures and signs. Descriptive criteria for the rule system were developed for the analysis video-recorded continuous production of signs and gesture. It involves segmenting a stream of body movement into phases and identifying different phase types. Two human coders used the criteria to analyze signs and cospeech gestures that are produced in natural discourse. It was found that the criteria yielded good inter-coder reliability. These criteria can be used for the technology of automatic recognition of signs and co-speech gestures in order to segment continuous production and identify the potentially meaningbearing phase.

Abstract

Nannten die Erwachsenen irgend einen Gegenstand und wandten sie sich dabei ihm zu, so nahm ich das wahr und ich begriff, daß der Gegenstand durch die Laute, die sie aussprachen, bezeichnet wurde, da sie auf ihn hinweisen wollten. Dies aber entnahm ich aus ihren Gebärden, der natürlichen Sprache aller Völker, der Sprache, die durch Mienen- und Augenspiel, durch die Bewegungen der Glieder und den Klang der Stimme die Empfindungen der Seele anzeigt, wenn diese irgend etwas begehrt, oder festhält, oder zurückweist, oder flieht. So lernte ich nach und nach verstehen, welche Dinge die Wörter bezeichneten, die ich wieder und wieder, an ihren bestimmten Stellen in verschiedenen Sätzen, aussprechen hörte. Und ich brachte, als nun mein Mund sich an diese Zeichen gewöhnt hatte, durch sie meine Wünsche zum Ausdruck. (Augustinus, Confessiones I, 8) Dies ist das Zitat eines Zitats: Zu Beginn der Philosophischen Untersuchungen führt Ludwig Wittgenstein diese Stelle aus Augustinus’ Bekenntnissen an, in denen dieser beschreibt, wie er seiner Erinnerung nach seine Muttersprache gelernt hat (Wittgenstein führt den lateinischen Text an und gibt dann seine Übersetzung, hier ist nur letztere zitiert). Sie bilden den Ausgangspunkt für Wittgensteins berühmte Überlegungen über die Funktionsweise der menschlichen Sprache und für seine Idee des Sprachspiels. Nun weiß man nicht, wie genau sich Augustinus wirklich erinnert und ob er sich all dies, wie so viel, was seither über den Spracherwerb gesagt und geschrieben wurde, bloß zurechtgelegt hat, in der Meinung, so müsse es sein. Aber anders als so vieles, was seither über den Spracherwerb gesagt und geschrieben wurde, ist es wunderbar formuliert und enthält zwei Momente, die in der wissenschaftlichen Forschung bis heute, wenn denn nicht bestritten, so doch oft nicht gesehen und dort, wo sie denn gesehen, nicht wirklich ernstgenommen wurden: A. Wir lernen die Sprache in der alltäglichen Kommunikation mit der sozialen Umgebung. B. Um eine Sprache zu lernen, genügt es nicht, diese Sprache zu hören; vielmehr benötigen wir eine Fülle an begleitender Information, wie hier Gestik und Mimik der Erwachsenen. Beides möchte man eigentlich für selbstverständlich halten. Herodot erzählt die berühmte Geschichte des Pharaos Psammetich, der wissen wollte, was die erste und eigentliche Sprache der Menschen sei, und befahl, zwei Neugeborene aufwachsen zu lassen, ohne dass jemand zu ihnen spricht; das erste Wort, das sie äußern, klang, so erzählt Herodot, wie das phrygische Wort für Brot, und so nahm man denn an, die Ursprache des Menschen sei das Phrygische. In dieser Vorstellung vom Spracherwerb spielt der Input aus der sozialen Umgebung nur insofern eine Rolle, als die eigentliche, von Geburt an vorhandene Sprache durch eine andere verdrängt werden kann: Kinder, die in einer englischsprachigen Umgebung aufwachsen, sprechen nicht die Ursprache. Diese Theorie gilt heute als obsolet. Sie ist aber in ihrer Einschätzung vom relativen Gewicht dessen, was an sprachlichem Wissen von Anfang an vorhanden ist, und dem, was der sozialen Umgebung entnommen werden muss, manchen neueren Theorien des Spracherwerbs nicht ganz fern: In der Chomsky’schen Idee der Universalgrammatik, theoretische Grundlage eines wesentlichen Teils der modernen Spracherwerbsforschung, ist „die Sprache” hauptsächlich etwas Angeborenes, insoweit gleich für alle Menschen und vom jeweiligen Input unabhängig. Das, was das Kind oder, beim Zweitspracherwerb, der erwachsene Lerner an Sprachlichem aus seiner Umgebung erfährt, wird nicht genutzt, um daraus bestimmte Regelhaftigkeiten abzuleiten und sich diese anzueignen; der Input fungiert eher als eine Art externer Auslöser für latent bereits vorhandenes Wissen. Für das Erlernen des Wortschatzes gilt dies sicher nicht. Es kann nicht angeboren sein, dass der Mond luna heißt. Für andere Bereiche der Sprache ist das Ausmaß des Angeborenen aber durchaus umstritten. Bei dieser Denkweise gilt das unter A Gesagte nicht. Die meisten modernen Spracherwerbsforscher schreiben dem Input ein wesentlich höheres Gewicht zu: Wir kopieren die charakteristischen Eigenschaften eines bestimmten sprachlichen Systems, indem wir den Input analysieren, um so die ihm zugrundeliegenden Regularitäten abzuleiten. Der Input tritt uns in Form von Schallfolgen (oder Gesten und später geschriebenen Zeichen) entgegen, die von anderen, die das System beherrschen, zu kommunikativen Zwecken verwendet werden. Diese Schallfolgen müssen die Lernenden in kleinere Einheiten zerlegen, diese mit Bedeutungen versehen und nach den Regularitäten abklopfen, denen gemäß sie sich zu komplexeren Ausdrücken verbinden lassen. Dies – und vieles andere – ist es, was das dem Menschen angeborene Sprachvermögen leistet, keine andere Spezies kann es (einem Pferd kann man so viel Chinesisch vorspielen, wie man will, es wird es nicht lernen). Aber auch wir könnten es nicht, wenn wir nur den Schall hätten. Wenn man, in einer Abwandlung des Psammetich’schen Versuchs, jemanden in ein Zimmer einsperren und tagaus tagein mit Chinesisch beschallen und im Übrigen gut versorgen würde, so würde er es, gleich ob als Kind oder als Erwachsener, nicht lernen. Vielleicht würde er einige strukturelle Eigenschaften des Schallstroms ausfindig machen; aber er würde auch nach Jahren kein Chinesisch können. Man benötigt den Schallstrom als sinnlich fassbaren Ausdruck der zugrundeliegenden Sprache, und man benötigt all die Informationen, die man der jeweiligen Redesituation oder aber seinem bereits vorhandenen anderweitigen Wissen entnehmen kann. Augustinus hat beides radikal vereinfacht; aber im Prinzip hat er Recht, und man sollte daher von der Spracherwerbsforschung erwarten, dass sie dies in Rechnung stellt. Das tut sie aber selten. Soweit sie überhaupt aus dem Gehäuse der Theorie tritt und sich den tatsächlichen Verlauf des Spracherwerbs anschaut, konzentriert sie sich weithin auf das, was die Kinder selbst sagen – dazu dienen ausgedehnte Corpora –, oder aber sie untersucht in experimentellen Settings, wie Kinder bestimmte Wörter oder Strukturen verstehen oder auch nicht verstehen. Das hat auch, wenn denn gut gemacht, einen hohen Aufschlusswert. Aber die eigentliche Verarbeitung des Inputs im doppelten Sinne – Schallwellen und Parallelinformation – wird selten in den Mittelpunkt des Interesses gerückt. Dies führt zu eigentümlichen Verzerrungen. So betrachtet man in der Spracherwerbsforschung vor allem deklarative Hauptsätze. Ein nicht unwesentlicher Teil dessen, was Kinder hören, besteht aber aus Imperativen („Tu das!“, „Tu das nicht!“). In solchen Imperativen gibt es normalerweise kein Subjekt. Ein intelligentes Kind muss daher zu dem Schluss kommen, dass das Deutsche in einem nicht unwesentlichen Teil seiner grammatischen Strukturen eine „pro drop-Sprache” ist, d.h. eine Sprache, in dem man das Subjekt weglassen kann. Kein Linguist käme auf diese Idee; sie entspricht aber den tatsächlichen Verhältnissen, und dies schlägt sich in dem Input, den das Kind verarbeiten muss, nieder. Dieses Heft befasst sich mit einer Spracherwerbssituation, in der – anders als beispielsweise bei einem Gespräch am Frühstückstisch – der Input in seiner doppelten Form gut zu überschauen ist, ohne dass die Situation, wie etwa bei einem kontrollierten Experiment, unnatürlich und der normalen Lernumgebung ferne wäre: mit dem Anschauen, Vorlesen und Lesen von Kinderbüchern. Man kann sich eine solche Situation als eine natürliche Ausweitung dessen vorstellen, was Augustinus beschreibt: Die Kinder hören, was die Erwachsenen sagen, und ihre Aufmerksamkeit wird auf bestimmte Dinge gerichtet, während sie hören und schauen – nur geht es hier nicht um einzelne Wörter, sondern um komplexe Ausdrücke und um komplexe, aber dennoch überschaubare begleitende Informationen. Nun haben Kinderbücher in der Spracherwerbsforschung durchaus eine Rolle gespielt. Dabei dienen sie – sei es als reine Folge von Bildern, sei es mit Text oder gar nur als Text – aber meistens nur als eine Art Vorlage für die Sprachproduktion der Kinder: Sie sollen aus der Vorlage eine Geschichte ableiten und in ihren eigenen Worten erzählen. Das bekannteste, aber keineswegs das einzige Beispiel sind die von Michael Bamberg, Ruth Berman und Dan Slobin in den 1980er Jahren initiierten „frog stories” – Nacherzählungen einer einfachen Bildgeschichte, die inzwischen in zahlreichen Sprachen vorliegen und viele Aufschlüsse über die unterschiedlichsten Aspekte der sich entwickelnden Sprachbeherrschung, von der Flexionsmorphologie bis zur Textstruktur, gebracht haben. Das ist gut und sinnvoll; aber im Grunde müsste man einen Schritt weiter gehen, nämlich gleichsam wir durch ein Mikroskop zu schauen, wie sich die Kinder ihre Regularitäten aus der Interaktion ableiten. Dies würde unsere Vorstellungen über den Verlauf des Spracherwerbs und die Gesetzlichkeiten, nach denen er erfolgt, wesentlich bereichern, vielleicht auf eine ganz neue Basis stellen. Die Beiträge dieses Heftes geben dafür eine Reihe von Beispielen, von denen nur ein kleines, aber besonders schlagendes erwähnt werden soll. Es gibt zahlreiche, auf Bildgeschichten beruhende Analysen, in denen untersucht wird, wie Kinder eine bestimmte Person oder eine Sache im fortlaufenden Diskurs benennen – ob sie etwa definite und indefinite Nominalausdrücke (ein Junge – der Junge), lexikalische oder pronominale Nominalphrasen (der Junge – er) oder gar leere Elemente (der Junge wacht auf und 0 schaut nach seinem Hund) richtig verwenden können. Das Bild, das die Forschung in diesem wesentlichen Teil der Sprachbeherrschung heute bietet, ist alles andere als einheitlich. So umfassen die Ansichten darüber, wann die Definit-Indefinit-Unterscheidung gemeistert wird, den größten Teil der Kindheit, je nachdem, welche Untersuchungen man zu Rate zieht. In dem Aufsatz von Katrin Dammann-Thedens wird deutlich, dass Kindern in einem bestimmen Alter oft überhaupt nicht klar ist, dass eine bestimmte Person, eine bestimmte Sache auf fortlaufenden Bildern dieselbe ist – auch wenn sie ähnlich aussieht –, und das ist bei Licht besehen ja auch keine triviale Frage. Diese Beobachtungen werfen ein ganz neues Licht auf die Idee der referentiellen Kontinuität im Diskurs und ihren Ausdruck durch nominale Ausdrücke wie die eben genannten. Vielleicht haben wir ganz falsche Vorstellungen darüber, wie Kinder die begleitende Information – hier durch die Bilder einer Geschichte geliefert – verstehen und damit für den Spracherwerb verarbeiten. Derlei Beobachtungen sind zunächst einmal etwas Punktuelles, keine Antworten, sondern Hinweise auf Dinge, die man bedenken muss. Aber ihre Analyse, und allgemeiner, ein genauerer Blick auf das, was sich tatsächlich abspielt, wenn Kinder sich Kinderbücher anschauen, mag uns vielleicht zu einem wesentlich tieferen Verständnis dessen führen, was beim Erwerb einer Sprache tatsächlich geschieht.

Abstract

During the last 25 years, second language acquisition (SLA) research hasmade considerable progress, but is still far from proving a solid basis for foreign language teaching, or from a general theory of SLA. In addition, its status within the linguistic disciplines is still very low. I argue this has not much to do with low empirical or theoretical standards in the field—in this regard, SLA research is fully competitive—but with a particular perspective on the acquisition process: SLA researches learners' utterances as deviations from a certain target, instead of genuine manifestations of underlying language capacity; it analyses them in terms of what they are not rather than what they are. For some purposes such a "target deviation perspective" makes sense, but it will not help SLA researchers to substantially and independently contribute to a deeper understanding of the structure and function of the human language faculty. Therefore, these findings will remain of limited interest to other scientists until SLA researchers consider learner varieties a normal, in fact typical, manifestation of this unique human capacity.

Abstract

A contentious issue in memory research is whether verbal short-term memory (STM) depends on a neural system specifically dedicated to the temporary maintenance of information, or instead relies on the same brain areas subserving the comprehension and production of language. In this study, we examined a large sample of adults with acquired brain lesions to identify the critical neural substrates underlying verbal STM and the relationship between verbal STM and language processing abilities. We found that patients with damage to selective regions of left perisylvian cortex – specifically the inferior frontal and posterior temporal sectors – were impaired on auditory–verbal STM performance (digit span), as well as on tests requiring the production and/or comprehension of language. These results support the conclusion that verbal STM and language processing are mediated by the same areas of left perisylvian cortex.

Abstract

Why does chanting, drumming or dancing together make people feel united? Here we investigate the neural mechanisms underlying interpersonal synchrony and its subsequent effects on prosocial behavior among synchronized individuals. We hypothesized that areas of the brain associated with the processing of reward would be active when individuals experience synchrony during drumming, and that these reward signals would increase prosocial behavior toward this synchronous drum partner. 18 female non-musicians were scanned with functional magnetic resonance imaging while they drummed a rhythm, in alternating blocks, with two different experimenters: one drumming in-synchrony and the other out-of-synchrony relative to the participant. In the last scanning part, which served as the experimental manipulation for the following prosocial behavioral test, one of the experimenters drummed with one half of the participants in-synchrony and with the other out-of-synchrony. After scanning, this experimenter "accidentally" dropped eight pencils, and the number of pencils collected by the participants was used as a measure of prosocial commitment. Results revealed that participants who mastered the novel rhythm easily before scanning showed increased activity in the caudate during synchronous drumming. The same area also responded to monetary reward in a localizer task with the same participants. The activity in the caudate during experiencing synchronous drumming also predicted the number of pencils the participants later collected to help the synchronous experimenter of the manipulation run. In addition, participants collected more pencils to help the experimenter when she had drummed in-synchrony than out-of-synchrony during the manipulation run. By showing an overlap in activated areas during synchronized drumming and monetary reward, our findings suggest that interpersonal synchrony is related to the brain's reward system.