Presentations

Abstract

Introduction: Natural communication is not only literal, but to a large extent also inferential. For example, sometimes people say "It is hard to give a good presentation" to actually mean "Your talk was a mess!", and listeners need to infer the speaker’s hidden message. In spite of the pervasiveness of this phenomenon in everyday communication, and even though the hidden meaning is often what it’s all about, very little is known about how the brain supports the comprehension of indirect language. What are the neural systems involved in the inferential process , and how are they different from those involved in word- and sentence-level meaning processing? We investigated the neural correlates of this so-called pragmatic inferencing in an fMRI study involving natural spoken dialogue. Methods: As a test case, we focused on the inferences needed to understand indirect replies. 18 native listeners of Dutch listened to dialogues ending in a question-answer (QA) pair. The final and critical utterance, e.g., "It is hard to give a good presentation", had different meanings depending on the dialogue context and the immediately preceding question: (1) Direct reply: Q: "How is it to give a good presentation?" A: "It is hard to give a good presentation" (2) Indirect reply, neutral: Q: "Will you give a presentation at the conference?" (rather than a poster) A: "It is hard to give a good presentation" (3) Indirect reply, face-saving: Q: "Did you like my presentation?" A: "It is hard to give a good presentation" While one of the indirect conditions was neutral, the other involved a socio-emotional aspect, as the reason for indirectness was to 'save one’s face' (as in excuses or polite refusals). Participants were asked to pay attention to the dialogues and, to ensure the latter, occasionally received a comprehension question (on filler items only). No other task demands were imposed. Results: Relative to direct replies in exchanges like (1), the indirect replies in exchanges like (2) and (3) activated brain structures associated with theory of mind and inferencing: right angular gyrus (TPJ), right DM prefrontal / frontal cortex (SMA, ACC). Both types of indirect replies also bilaterally activated the insula, an area known to be involved in empathy and affective processing. Moreover, both types of indirect replies recruited bilateral inferior frontal gyrus, thought to play a role in situation model updating. The comparison between neutral (2) and face-saving (3) indirect replies revealed that the presumed affective load of the face-saving replies activated just one additional area: right inferior frontal gyrus; we did not see any activation in classic affect-related areas. Importantly, we used the same critical sentences in all conditions. Our results can thus not be explained by lexico-semantic or other (e.g. syntactic, word frequency) factors. Conclusions: To extend neurocognitive research on meaning in language beyond the level of straightforward literal utterances, we investigated the neural correlates of pragmatic inferencing in an fMRI study involving indirect replies in natural spoken dialogue. Our findings reveal that the areas used to infer the intended meaning of an implicit message are partly different from the classic language network. Furthermore, the identity of the areas involved is consistent with the idea that inferring hidden meanings requires taking the speaker’s perspective. This confirms the importance of perspective taking in language comprehension, even in a situation where the listener is not the one addressed. Also, as the areas recruited by indirect replies generally do not light up in standard fMRI sentence comprehension paradigms, our study testifies to the importance of studying language understanding in richer contexts in which we can tap aspects of pragmatic processing, beyond the literal code.

Abstract

In an event-related fMRI study, we examined the overlap between the implicit processing of structured sequences, generated by a simple right-linear artificial unification grammar, with natural syntax related variability in the same subjects. Research investigating rule learning of potential linguistic relevance through artificial syntax often uses performance feedback and/or explicit instruction concerning the underlying rules. It is assumed that this approach ensures the right type of ''rule-following''because the rules are either explicitly provided to the subjects or explicitly discovered by the subjects during trial-and-error learning with feedback. In this work, we use a novel implicit preference classification task based on the structural mere exposure effect. Under conditions that in important respects are similar to those of natural language development (i. e., no explicit learning or teaching instruction, and no performance feedback), 32 subjects were exposed for 5 days to grammatical sequences during an immediate short-term memory task. On day 5, a preference classification test was administered, in which new sequences were presented. In addition, natural language data was acquired in the same subjects. Implicit preference classification was sensitive enough to show robust behavioral and fMRI effects. Preference classification of structured sequences activated Broca's region (BA 44/45) significantly, and was further activated by artificial syntactic violations. The effects related to artificial syntax in BA 44/45 were identical when we masked these with activity related to natural syntax processing. Moreover, the medial temporal lobe was deactivated during artificial syntax processing, consistent with the view that implicit processing does not rely on declarative memory mechanisms supported by the medial temporal lobe. In summary, we show that implicit acquisition of structured sequence knowledge results in the engagement of Broca's region during structured sequence processing. We conclude that Broca's region is a generic on-line sequence processor integrating information, in an incremental and recursive manner, independent of whether the sequences processed are structured by a natural or an artificial syntax.

Abstract

Repetition suppression is generally accepted as the neural correlate of behavioural priming and is often used to selectively identify the neuronal representations associated with a stimulus. However, this does not explain the large number of repetition enhancement effects observed under very similar conditions. Based on a review of a large set of studies we propose several variables biasing repetition effects towards enhancement instead of suppression. On the one hand, there are stimulus variables which influence the direction of repetition effects: visibility, e. g. in the case of degraded stimuli perceptual learning occurs; novelty, e. g. in case of unfamiliar stimuli a novel network formation process occurs; and timing intervals, e. g. repetition effects are sensitive to stimulus onset asynchronies. On the other hand, repetition effects are not solely automatic processes, triggered by particular types or sequences of stimuli. The brain is continuously and actively filtering, attending to and interpreting the information provided by our senses. Consequently, internal state variables like attention, expectation and explicit memory modulate repetition effects towards enhancement versus suppression. Current models i.e. the accumulation, fatigue and sharpening models of repetition suppression have so far left out top-down factors and cannot or can only partially account for repetition enhancement effects. Instead we propose that models which incorporate both stimulus bottom-up and cognitive top-down factors are called for in order to better understand repetition effects. A good candidate is the predictive coding model in which sensory evidence is interpreted according to subjective biases and statistical accounts of past encounters.

Abstract

Speaking is a complex, multilevel process, in which the first step is to compute the message that can be syntactically and phonologically encoded. Computing the message requires constructing a mental representation of what we want to express (the reference). This reference is then mapped onto linguistic concepts stored in memory, by which the meaning of the utterance (the sense) is constructed. We used fMRI adaptation to investigate brain areas sensitive to reference and sense in overt speech. By independently manipulating repetition of reference and sense across subsequently produced sentences in a picture description task, we distinguished sets of regions sensitive to these two steps in speaking. Encoding reference involved the bilateral inferior parietal lobes (BA 39) and right inferior frontal gyrus (BA 45), suggesting a role in constructing a non-linguistic mental representation. Left middle frontal gyrus (BA 6), bilateral superior parietal lobes and bilateral posterior temporal gyri (BA 37)) were sensitive to both sense and reference processing. These regions thus seem to support semantic encoding, the process of mapping reference onto sense. Left inferior frontal gyrus (BA 45), left middle frontal gyrus (BA44) and left angular gyrus (BA 39) showed adaptation to sense, and therefore appear sensitive to the output of semantic encoding. These results reveal the neural architecture for the first steps in producing an utterance. In addition, they show the feasibility of studying overt speech at a detailed level of analysis in fMRI studies.

Abstract

Speaking is a complex, multilevel process, in which the first step is to compute the message that can be syntactically and phonologically encoded. Computing the message requires constructing a mental representation of what we want to express (the reference). This referent is mapped onto linguistic concepts stored in memory, by which the meaning of the utterance (the sense) is constructed. So far, one study targeted semantic encoding in sentence production (Menenti, Segaert & Hagoort, submitted) and none dissected this process further. We used fMRI adaptation to investigate brain areas sensitive to reference and sense in overt speech. fMRI adaptation is a phenomenon whereby repeating a stimulus property changes the BOLD-response in regions sensitive to that property. By independently manipulating repetition of reference and sense across subsequently produced sentences in a picture description task we distinguished sets of areas sensitive to these steps in semantic encoding in speaking. Methods: In a picture description paradigm, the described situation (the reference) and the linguistic semantic structure (the sense) of subsequently produced sentences were independently repeated across trials. Participants described pictures depicting events involving transitive verbs such as hit, kiss, greet, and two actors colored in different colors with sentences such as ‘The red man greets the green woman’. In our factorial design, the same situation involving the same actors could subsequently be described by two different sentences (repeated reference, novel sense) or the same sentence could subsequently be used to describe two different situations (novel reference, repeated sense). For reference, we controlled for the repetition of actors. For sense, we controlled for the repetition of individual words. See figure 1 for design and stimuli. To correct for increased movement and susceptibility artifacts due to speech, we scanned using 3T-fMRI parallel-acquired inhomogeneity-desensitized fMRI (Poser, Versluis, Hoogduin et al. 2006). Five images were acquired per TR and combined based on local T2* (Buur, Poser and Norris 2009). Results: The behavioral data (response onset, response duration and total time to complete the responses) showed effects of both sense and reference. In the fMRI analyses we looked for areas sensitive to only sense, only reference, or showing a conjunction of both factors. Encoding reference involved the bilateral inferior parietal lobes (BA 39), which showed repetition suppression, and right inferior frontal gyrus (BA 45), which showed repetition enhancement. Left inferior frontal gyrus (BA 45) showed suppression to repetition of sense, while left middle frontal gyrus (BA44) and left angular gyrus (BA 39) showed enhancement. Left middle frontal gyrus (BA 6), bilateral superior parietal lobes and bilateral posterior temporal gyri (BA 37)) showed repetition suppression to both sense and reference processing (conjunction analysis with conjunction null). See figure 2 for the results (p<.05 FWE corrected for multiple comparisons at cluster-level, maps thresholded at p<.001 uncorrected voxel-level.) Conclusions: The input to semantic encoding is construction of a referent, a mental representation that the utterance is about. The bilateral temporo-parietal junctions are involved in this process as they show sensitivity to repetition of reference but not sense. RIFG shows enhancement and may therefore be involved in constructing a more comprehensive model spanning several utterances. Semantic encoding itself requires mapping of the reference onto the sense. This involves large parts of the language network: bilateral posterior temporal lobes and upper left inferior frontal gyrus were sensitive to both reference and sense. Finally, sense recruits left inferior frontal gyrus (BA 45). This area is sensitive to syntactic encoding (Bookheimer 2002), the next step in speaking. These results reveal the neural architecture for the first steps in producing an utterance. In addition, they show the feasibility of studying overt speech at a detailed level of analysis in fMRI studies. References: Bookheimer, S. (2002), 'Functional MRI of language: new approaches to understanding the cortical organization of semantic procesing', Annual review of neuroscience, vol. 25, pp. 151-188. Buur, P. (2009), 'A dual echo approach to removing motion artefacts in fMRI time series', Magnetic Resonance in Medicine, vol. 22, no. 5, pp. 551-560. Menenti, L. (submitted), 'The neuronal infrastructure of speaking'. Poser, B. (2006), 'BOLD contrast sensitivity enhancement and artifact reduction with multiecho EPI: parallel-acquired inhomogeneity desensitized fMRI', Magnetic Resonance in Medicine, vol. 55, pp. 1227-1235.