Publications

Abstract

In spoken languages, children acquire locative terms in a cross-linguistically stable order. Terms similar in meaning to in and on emerge earlier than those similar to front and behind, followed by left and right. This order has been attributed to the complexity of the relations expressed by different locative terms. An additional possibility is that children may be delayed in expressing certain spatial meanings partly due to difficulties in discovering the mappings between locative terms in speech and spatial relation they express. We investigate cognitive and mapping difficulties in the domain of spatial language by comparing how children map spatial meanings onto speech versus visually motivated forms in co-speech gesture across different spatial relations. Twenty-four 8-year-old and 23 adult native Turkish-speakers described four-picture displays where the target picture depicted in-on, front-behind, or left-right relations between objects. As the complexity of spatial relations increased, children were more likely to rely on gestures as opposed to speech to informatively express the spatial relation. Adults overwhelmingly relied on speech to informatively express the spatial relation, and this did not change across the complexity of spatial relations. Nevertheless, even when spatial expressions in both speech and co-speech gesture were considered, children lagged behind adults when expressing the most complex left-right relations. These findings suggest that cognitive development and mapping difficulties introduced by the modality of expressions interact in shaping the development of spatial language.

Abstract

When monitoring the origins of their memories, people tend to mistakenly attribute mem- ories generated from internal processes (e.g., imagination, visualization) to perception. Here, we ask whether speaking a language that obligatorily encodes the source of informa- tion might help prevent such errors. We compare speakers of English to speakers of Turkish, a language that obligatorily encodes information source (direct/perceptual vs. indirect/hearsay or inference) for past events. In our experiments, participants reported having seen events that they had only inferred from post-event visual evidence. In general, error rates were higher when visual evidence that gave rise to inferences was relatively close to direct visual evidence. Furthermore, errors persisted even when participants were asked to report the specific sources of their memories. Crucially, these error patterns were equivalent across language groups, suggesting that speaking a language that obligatorily encodes source of information does not increase sensitivity to the distinction between per- ception and inference in event memory.

Abstract

It has long been recognized that language interacts with visual and spatial processes. However, the nature and extent of these interactions are widely debated. The goal of this article is to review empirical findings across several domains to understand whether language affects the way speakers conceptualize the world even when they are not speaking or understanding speech. A second goal of the present review is to shed light on the mechanisms through which effects of language are transmitted. Across domains, there is growing support for the idea that although language does not lead to long-lasting changes in mental representations, it exerts powerful influences during momentary mental computations by either modulating attention or augmenting representational power

Abstract

Although children typically comprehend the links between specific forms and their mean- ings before they produce the forms themselves, the opposite pattern also occurs. The nat- ure of these ‘reverse asymmetries’ between production and comprehension remains debated. Here we focus on a striking case where production precedes comprehension in the acquisition of Turkish evidential morphology and explore theoretical explanations of this asymmetry. We show that 3- to 6-year-old Turkish learners produce evidential mor- phemes accurately (Experiment 1) but have difficulty with evidential comprehension (Experiment 2). Furthermore, comprehension failures persist across multiple tasks (Experiments 3–4). We suggest that evidential comprehension is delayed by the develop- ment of mental perspective-taking abilities needed to compute others’ knowledge sources. In support for this hypothesis, we find that children have difficulty reasoning about others’ evidence in non-linguistic tasks but the difficulty disappears when the tasks involve accessing one’s own evidential sources (Experiment 5)