Publications

Abstract

It is unclear whether cognitive and motor control are parallel and interactive or serial and independent processes. According to one view, cognitive control refers to a set of modality-nonspecific processes that act on supramodal representations and precede response modality-specific motor processes. An alternative view is that cognitive control represents a set of modality-specific operations that act directly on motor-related representations, implying dependence of cognitive control on motor control. Here, we examined the influence of response modality (vocal vs. manual) on three well-established subcomponent processes of cognitive control: shifting, inhibiting, and updating. We observed effects of all subcomponent processes in reaction times. The magnitude of these effects did not differ between response modalities for shifting and inhibiting, in line with a serial, supramodal view. However, the magnitude of the updating effect differed between modalities, in line with an interactive, modality-specific view. These results suggest that updating represents a modality-specific operation that depends on motor control, whereas shifting and inhibiting represent supramodal operations that act independently of motor control.

Abstract

Since Pillsbury [1908. Attention. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co], the issue of whether attention operates through inhibition or enhancement has been on the scientific agenda. We examined whether overcoming previous attentional inhibition or enhancement is the source of asymmetrical switch costs in spoken noun-phrase production and colour-word Stroop tasks. In Experiment 1, using bivalent stimuli, we found asymmetrical costs in response times for switching between long and short phrases and between Stroop colour naming and reading. However, in Experiment 2, using bivalent stimuli for the weaker tasks (long phrases, colour naming) and univalent stimuli for the stronger tasks (short phrases, word reading), we obtained an asymmetrical switch cost for phrase production, but a symmetrical cost for Stroop. The switch cost evidence was quantified using Bayesian statistical analyses. Our findings suggest that switching between phrase types involves inhibition, whereas switching between colour naming and reading involves enhancement. Thus, the attentional mechanism depends on the language-production task involved. The results challenge theories of task switching that assume only one attentional mechanism, inhibition or enhancement, rather than both mechanisms.

Abstract

Although bilingual speakers are very good at selectively using one language rather than another, sometimes language selection errors occur. To investigate how bilinguals monitor their speech errors and control their languages in use, we recorded event-related potentials (ERPs) in unbalanced Dutch-English bilingual speakers in a cued language-switching task. We tested the conflict-based monitoring model of Nozari and colleagues by investigating the error-related negativity (ERN) and comparing the effects of the two switching directions (i.e., to the first language, L1 vs. to the second language, L2). Results show that the speakers made more language selection errors when switching from their L2 to the L1 than vice versa. In the EEG, we observed a robust ERN effect following language selection errors compared to correct responses, reflecting monitoring of speech errors. Most interestingly, the ERN effect was enlarged when the speakers were switching to their L2 (less conflict) compared to switching to the L1 (more conflict). Our findings do not support the conflict-based monitoring model. We discuss an alternative account in terms of error prediction and reinforcement learning.

Abstract

Although bilingual speakers are very good at selectively using one language rather than another, sometimes language selection errors occur. We examined the relative contribution of top-down cognitive control and bottom-up language priming to these errors. Unbalanced Dutch-English bilinguals named pictures and were cued to switch between languages under time pressure. We also manipulated the number of same-language trials before a switch (long vs. short runs). Results show that speakers made more language selection errors when switching from their second language (L2) to the first language (L1) than vice versa. Furthermore, they made more errors when switching to the L1 after a short compared to a long run of L2 trials. In the reverse switching direction (L1 to L2), run length had no effect. These findings are most compatible with an account of language selection errors that assigns a strong role to top-down processes of cognitive control.

Abstract

Four experiments examined crossmodal versions of the Stroop task in order (1) to look for Stroop asymmetries in color naming, spoken-word naming, and written-word naming and to evaluate the time course of these asymmetries, and (2) to compare these findings to current models of the Stroop effect. Participants named color patches while ignoring spoken color words presented with an onset varying from 300 msec before to 300 msec after the onset of the color (Experiment 1), or they named the spoken words and ignored the colors (Experiment 2). A secondary visual detection task assured that the participants looked at the colors in both tasks. Spoken color words yielded Stroop effects in color naming, but colors did not yield an effect in spoken-word naming at any stimulus onset asynchrony. This asymmetry in effects was obtained with equivalent color- and spoken-word-naming latencies. Written color words yielded a Stroop effect in naming spoken words (Experiment 3), and spoken color words yielded an effect in naming written words (Experiment 4). These results were interpreted as most consistent with an architectural account of the color-word Stroop asymmetry, in contrast with discriminability and pathway strength accounts.

Abstract

Three experiments are reported that examined whether stem complexity plays a role in inflecting polymorphemic words in language production. Experiment 1 showed that preparation effects for words with polymorphemic stems are larger when they are produced among words with constant inflectional structures compared to words with variable inflectional structures and simple stems. This replicates earlier findings for words with monomorphemic stems (Janssen et al., 2002). Experiments 2 and 3 showed that when inflectional structure is held constant, the preparation effects are equally large with simple and compound stems, and with compound and complex adjectival stems. These results indicate that inflectional encoding is blind to the complexity of the stem, which suggests that specific inflectional rather than generic morphological frames guide the generation of inflected forms in speaking words.

Abstract

How can one conceive of the neuronal implementation of the processing model we proposed in our target article? In his commentary (Pulvermüller 1999, reprinted here in this issue), Pulvermüller makes various proposals concerning the underlying neural mechanisms and their potential localizations in the brain. These proposals demonstrate the compatibility of our processing model and current neuroscience. We add further evidence on details of localization based on a recent meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies of word production (Indefrey & Levelt 2000). We also express some minor disagreements with respect to Pulvermüller’s interpretation of the “lemma” notion, and concerning his neural modeling of phonological code retrieval. Branigan & Pickering discuss important aspects of syntactic encoding, which was not the topic of the target article. We discuss their well-taken proposal that multiple syntactic frames for a single verb lemma are represented as independent nodes, which can be shared with other verbs, such as accounting for syntactic priming in speech production. We also discuss how, in principle, the alternative multiple-frame-multiplelemma account can be tested empirically. The available evidence does not seem to support that account.

Abstract

This study investigates how speakers of Dutch compute and produce relative time expressions. Naming digital clocks (e.g., 2:45, say ‘‘quarter to three’’) requires conceptual operations on the minute and hour information for the correct relative time expression. The interplay of these conceptual operations was investigated using a repetition priming paradigm. Participants named analog clocks (the primes) directly before naming digital clocks (the targets). The targets referred to the hour (e.g., 2:00), half past the hour (e.g., 2:30), or the coming hour (e.g., 2:45). The primes differed from the target in one or two hour and in five or ten minutes. Digital clock naming latencies were shorter with a five- than with a ten-min difference between prime and target, but the difference in hour had no effect. Moreover, the distance in minutes had only an effect for half past the hour and the coming hour, but not for the hour. These findings suggest that conceptual facilitation occurs when conceptual transformations are shared between prime and target in telling time.

Abstract

There is a remarkable lack of research bringing together the literatures on oral reading and speaking.
As concerns phonological encoding, both models of reading and speaking assume a process of segmental
spellout for words, which is followed by serial prosodification in models of speaking (e.g., Levelt,
Roelofs, & Meyer, 1999). Thus, a natural place to merge models of reading and speaking would be
at the level of segmental spellout. This view predicts similar seriality effects in reading and object naming.
Experiment 1 showed that the seriality of encoding inside a syllable revealed in previous studies
of speaking is observed for both naming objects and reading their names. Experiment 2 showed that
both object naming and reading exhibit the seriality of the encoding of successive syllables previously
observed for speaking. Experiment 3 showed that the seriality is also observed when object naming and
reading trials are mixed rather than tested separately, as in the first two experiments. These results suggest
that a serial phonological encoding mechanism is shared between naming objects and reading
their names.

Abstract

Although humans are the ultimate “natural language generators”, the area of psycholinguistic modeling has been somewhat underrepresented in recent approaches to Natural Language Generation in computer science. To draw attention to the area and illustrate its potential relevance to Natural Language Generation, I provide an overview of recent work on psycholinguistic modeling of language production together with some key empirical findings, state-of-the-art experimental techniques, and their historical roots. The techniques include analyses of speech-error corpora, chronometric analyses, eyetracking, and neuroimaging.
The overview is built around the issue of cognitive control in natural language generation, concentrating on the production of single words, which is an essential ingredient of the generation of larger utterances. Most of the work exploited the fact that human speakers are good but not perfect at resisting temptation, which has provided some critical clues about the nature of the underlying system.

Abstract

B. Rapp and M. Goldrick (2000) claimed that the lexical and mixed error biases in picture naming by
aphasic and nonaphasic speakers argue against models that assume a feedforward-only relationship
between lexical items and their sounds in spoken word production. The author contests this claim by
showing that a feedforward-only model like WEAVER ++ (W. J. M. Levelt, A. Roelofs, & A. S. Meyer,
1999b) exhibits the error biases in word planning and self-monitoring. Furthermore, it is argued that
extant feedback accounts of the error biases and relevant chronometric effects are incompatible.
WEAVER ++ simulations with self-monitoring revealed that this model accounts for the chronometric
data, the error biases, and the influence of the impairment locus in aphasic speakers.

Abstract

WEAVER++ has no backward links in its form-production network and yet is able to explain the lexical
and mixed error biases and the mixed distractor latency effect. This refutes the claim of B. Rapp and M.
Goldrick (2000) that these findings specifically support production-internal feedback. Whether their restricted interaction account model can also provide a unified account of the error biases and latency effect remains to be shown.