Publications

Abstract

The language faculty is physically realized in the neurobiological infrastructure of the human brain. Despite significant efforts, an integrated understanding of this system remains a formidable challenge. What is missing from most theoretical accounts is a specification of the neural mechanisms that implement language function. Computational models that have been put forward generally lack an explicit neurobiological foundation. We propose a neurobiologically informed causal modeling approach which offers a framework for how to bridge this gap. A neurobiological causal model is a mechanistic description of language processing that is grounded in, and constrained by, the characteristics of the neurobiological substrate. It intends to model the generators of language behavior at the level of implementational causality. We describe key features and neurobiological component parts from which causal models can be built and provide guidelines on how to implement them in model simulations. Then we outline how this approach can shed new light on the core computational machinery for language, the long-term storage of words in the mental lexicon and combinatorial processing in sentence comprehension. In contrast to cognitive theories of behavior, causal models are formulated in the “machine language” of neurobiology which is universal to human cognition. We argue that neurobiological causal modeling should be pursued in addition to existing approaches. Eventually, this approach will allow us to develop an explicit computational neurobiology of language.

Abstract

Nativist theories have argued that language involves syntactic principles which are unlearnable from the input children receive. A paradigm case of these innate principles is the structure dependence of auxiliary inversion in complex polar questions (Chomsky, 1968, 1975, 1980). Computational approaches have focused on the properties of the input in explaining how children acquire these questions. In contrast, we argue that messages are structured in a way that supports structure dependence in syntax. We demonstrate this approach within a connectionist model of sentence production (Chang, 2009) which learned to generate a range of complex polar questions from a structured message without positive exemplars in the input. The model also generated different types of error in development that were similar in magnitude to those in children (e.g., auxiliary doubling, Ambridge, Rowland, & Pine, 2008; Crain & Nakayama, 1987). Through model comparisons we trace how meaning constraints and linguistic experience interact during the acquisition of auxiliary inversion. Our results suggest that auxiliary inversion rules in English can be acquired without innate syntactic principles, as long as it is assumed that speakers who ask complex questions express messages that are structured into multiple propositions