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Guest, O., & Love, B. C. (2017). What the success of brain imaging implies about the neural code. eLife, 6: e21397. doi:10.7554/eLife.21397.
Abstract
The success of fMRI places constraints on the nature of the neural code. The fact that researchers can infer similarities between neural representations, despite fMRI’s limitations, implies that certain neural coding schemes are more likely than others. For fMRI to succeed given its low temporal and spatial resolution, the neural code must be smooth at the voxel and functional level such that similar stimuli engender similar internal representations. Through proof and simulation, we determine which coding schemes are plausible given both fMRI’s successes and its limitations in measuring neural activity. Deep neural network approaches, which have been forwarded as computational accounts of the ventral stream, are consistent with the success of fMRI, though functional smoothness breaks down in the later network layers. These results have implications for the nature of the neural code and ventral stream, as well as what can be successfully investigated with fMRI. -
Rougier, N. P., Hinsen, K., Alexandre, F., Arildsen, T., Barba, L. A., Benureau, F. C. Y., Brown, C. T., De Buyl, P., Caglayan, O., Davison, A. P., Delsuc, M.-A., Detorakis, G., Diem, A. K., Drix, D., Enel, P., Girard, B., Guest, O., Hall, M. G., Henriques, R. N., Hinaut, X. and 25 moreRougier, N. P., Hinsen, K., Alexandre, F., Arildsen, T., Barba, L. A., Benureau, F. C. Y., Brown, C. T., De Buyl, P., Caglayan, O., Davison, A. P., Delsuc, M.-A., Detorakis, G., Diem, A. K., Drix, D., Enel, P., Girard, B., Guest, O., Hall, M. G., Henriques, R. N., Hinaut, X., Jaron, K. S., Khamassi, M., Klein, A., Manninen, T., Marchesi, P., McGlinn, D., Metzner, C., Petchey, O., Plesser, H. E., Poisot, T., Ram, K., Ram, Y., Roesch, E., Rossant, C., Rostami, V., Shifman, A., Stachelek, J., Stimberg, M., Stollmeier, F., Vaggi, F., Viejo, G., Vitay, J., Vostinar, A. E., Yurchak, R., & Zito, T. (2017). Sustainable computational science. PeerJ Computer Science, 3: e142. doi:10.7717/peerj-cs.142.
Abstract
Computer science offers a large set of tools for prototyping, writing, running, testing, validating, sharing and reproducing results; however, computational science lags behind. In the best case, authors may provide their source code as a compressed archive and they may feel confident their research is reproducible. But this is not exactly true. James Buckheit and David Donoho proposed more than two decades ago that an article about computational results is advertising, not scholarship. The actual scholarship is the full software environment, code, and data that produced the result. This implies new workflows, in particular in peer-reviews. Existing journals have been slow to adapt: source codes are rarely requested and are hardly ever actually executed to check that they produce the results advertised in the article. ReScience is a peer-reviewed journal that targets computational research and encourages the explicit replication of already published research, promoting new and open-source implementations in order to ensure that the original research can be replicated from its description. To achieve this goal, the whole publishing chain is radically different from other traditional scientific journals. ReScience resides on GitHub where each new implementation of a computational study is made available together with comments, explanations, and software tests. -
Guest, O., & Rougier, N. P. (2016). "What is computational reproducibility?" and "Diversity in reproducibility". IEEE CIS Newsletter on Cognitive and Developmental Systems, 13(2), 4 and 12.
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Cooper, R. P., & Guest, O. (2014). Implementations are not specifications: Specification, replication and experimentation in computational cognitive modeling. Cognitive Systems Research, 27, 42-49. doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2013.05.001.
Abstract
Contemporary methods of computational cognitive modeling have recently been criticized by Addyman and French (2012) on the grounds that they have not kept up with developments in computer technology and human–computer interaction. They present a manifesto for change according to which, it is argued, modelers should devote more effort to making their models accessible, both to non-modelers (with an appropriate easy-to-use user interface) and modelers alike. We agree that models, like data, should be freely available according to the normal standards of science, but caution against confusing implementations with specifications. Models may embody theories, but they generally also include implementation assumptions. Cognitive modeling methodology needs to be sensitive to this. We argue that specification, replication and experimentation are methodological approaches that can address this issue.
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