Publications

Abstract

It is the purpose of the present paper to highlight the figure of Eubulides, a relatively unknown Greek philosopher who lived ±405–330 BC and taught at Megara, not far from Athens. He is mainly known for his four paradoxes (the Liar, the Sorites, the Electra, and the Horns), and for the mutual animosity between him and his younger contemporary Aristotle. The Megarian school of philosophy was one of the main sources of the great Stoic tradition in ancient philosophy. What has never been made explicit in the literature is the importance of the four paradoxes for the study of meaning in natural language: they summarize the whole research programme of 20th century formal or formally oriented semantics, including the problems of vague predicates (Sorites), intensional contexts (Electra), and presuppositions (Horns). One might say that modern formal or formally oriented semantics is essentially an attempt at finding linguistically tenable answers to problems arising in the context of Aristotelian thought. It is a surprising and highly significant fact that a contemporary of Aristotle already spotted the main weaknesses of the Aristotelian paradigm.

Abstract

In his paper ‘On Horn's dilemma: presupposition and negation’ Burton-Roberts (1989a) presents an ambitious programme, formulated right at the outset. He seeks to establish three points: (i) Under the ‘standard logical definition of presupposition’ a pre-suppositional semantics is INCOMPATIBLE with a SEMANTICALLY AMBIGUOUS NEGATION operator (SAN), on pain of the theory being rendered ‘empirically empty and theoretically trivial’,. (ii) From this it follows that the one unambiguous negation is presupposition preserving. Cases that have been identified as presupposition-cancelling negation should be re-analysed as ‘instances of a pragmatic phenomenon’, not unlike what has been proposed in Horn (1985), that is as METALINGUISTIC NEGATION (MN). (iii) This pragmatic analysis of MN ‘itself implies a presuppositional semantics’, that is to say ‘a presuppositional theory of truth-value gaps’.