Publications

Abstract

Prior work with hearing children acquiring a spoken language as their first language shows that spatial language and cognition are related systems and spatial language use predicts spatial memory. Here, we further investigate the extent of this relationship in signing deaf children and adults and ask if late sign language exposure, as well as the frequency and the type of spatial language use that might be affected by late exposure, modulate subsequent memory for spatial relations. To do so, we compared spatial language and memory of 8-year-old late-signing children (after 2 years of exposure to a sign language at the school for the deaf) and late-signing adults to their native-signing counterparts. We elicited picture descriptions of Left-Right relations in Turkish Sign Language (Türk İşaret Dili) and measured the subsequent recognition memory accuracy of the described pictures. Results showed that late-signing adults and children were similar to their native-signing counterparts in how often they encoded the spatial relation. However, late-signing adults but not children differed from their native-signing counterparts in the type of spatial language they used. However, neither late sign language exposure nor the frequency and type of spatial language use modulated spatial memory accuracy. Therefore, even though late language exposure seems to influence the type of spatial language use, this does not predict subsequent memory for spatial relations. We discuss the implications of these findings based on the theories concerning the correspondence between spatial language and cognition as related or rather independent systems.

Abstract

When monitoring the origins of their memories, people tend to mistakenly attribute mem- ories generated from internal processes (e.g., imagination, visualization) to perception. Here, we ask whether speaking a language that obligatorily encodes the source of informa- tion might help prevent such errors. We compare speakers of English to speakers of Turkish, a language that obligatorily encodes information source (direct/perceptual vs. indirect/hearsay or inference) for past events. In our experiments, participants reported having seen events that they had only inferred from post-event visual evidence. In general, error rates were higher when visual evidence that gave rise to inferences was relatively close to direct visual evidence. Furthermore, errors persisted even when participants were asked to report the specific sources of their memories. Crucially, these error patterns were equivalent across language groups, suggesting that speaking a language that obligatorily encodes source of information does not increase sensitivity to the distinction between per- ception and inference in event memory.

Abstract

It has long been recognized that language interacts with visual and spatial processes. However, the nature and extent of these interactions are widely debated. The goal of this article is to review empirical findings across several domains to understand whether language affects the way speakers conceptualize the world even when they are not speaking or understanding speech. A second goal of the present review is to shed light on the mechanisms through which effects of language are transmitted. Across domains, there is growing support for the idea that although language does not lead to long-lasting changes in mental representations, it exerts powerful influences during momentary mental computations by either modulating attention or augmenting representational power

Abstract

Although children typically comprehend the links between specific forms and their mean- ings before they produce the forms themselves, the opposite pattern also occurs. The nat- ure of these ‘reverse asymmetries’ between production and comprehension remains debated. Here we focus on a striking case where production precedes comprehension in the acquisition of Turkish evidential morphology and explore theoretical explanations of this asymmetry. We show that 3- to 6-year-old Turkish learners produce evidential mor- phemes accurately (Experiment 1) but have difficulty with evidential comprehension (Experiment 2). Furthermore, comprehension failures persist across multiple tasks (Experiments 3–4). We suggest that evidential comprehension is delayed by the develop- ment of mental perspective-taking abilities needed to compute others’ knowledge sources. In support for this hypothesis, we find that children have difficulty reasoning about others’ evidence in non-linguistic tasks but the difficulty disappears when the tasks involve accessing one’s own evidential sources (Experiment 5)