Publications

Abstract

No idea is older in the history of linguistics than the thought that there is, somehow hidden underneath the surface of sentences, a form or a structure which provides a semantic analysis and lays bare their logical structure. In Plato’s Cratylus the theory was proposed, deriving from Heraclitus’ theory of explanatory underlying structure in physical nature, that words contain within themselves bits of syntactic structure giving their meanings. The Stoics held the same view and maintained moreover that every sentence has an underlying logical structure, which for them was the Aristotelian subject- predicate form. They even proposed transformational processes to derive the surface from the deep structure. The idea of a semantically analytic logical form underlying the sentences of every language kept reappearing in various guises at various times. Quite recently it re-emerged under the name of generative semantics.

Abstract

Referential expressions that refer to entities that occur in a text differ in lexical specificity. It is claimed that if these anaphoric expressions are more specific than necessary for their identificational function, they not only relate the current information to the intended referent, but also contribute to the expression of the thematic structure of the discourse and to the comprehension of the thematic structure. In two controlled production experiments, it is demonstrated that thematic shifts are produced when one has to make use of such an overspecified expression, and that overspecified referential expressions are produced when one has to formulate a thematic shift. In two comprehension experiments, using a probe recognition technique, it is shown that an overspecified referential expression decreases the availability of information contained in a sentence that precedes the overspecification. This finding is interpreted in terms of the thematic structuring function of referential expressions in the understanding of discourse.