Publications

Abstract

Repair is a core building block of human communication, allowing us to address problems of understanding in conversation. Past research has uncovered the basic mechanisms by which interactants signal and solve such problems. However, the focus has been on verbal interaction, neglecting the fact that human communication is inherently multimodal. Here, we focus on a visual signal particularly prevalent in signalling problems of understanding: eyebrow furrows and raises. We present, first, a corpus study showing that differences in eyebrow actions (furrows versus raises) were systematically associated with differences in the format of verbal repair initiations. Second, we present a follow-up study using an avatar that allowed us to test the causal consequences of addressee eyebrow movements, zooming into the effect of eyebrow furrows as signals of trouble in understanding in particular. The results revealed that addressees’ eyebrow furrows have a striking effect on speakers’ speech, leading speakers to produce answers to questions several seconds longer than when not perceiving addressee eyebrow furrows while speaking. Together, the findings demonstrate that eyebrow movements play a communicative role in initiating repair during conversation rather than being merely epiphenomenal and that their occurrence can critically influence linguistic behaviour. Thus, eyebrow movements should be considered core coordination devices in human conversational interaction.

Abstract

Daniel Dennett, in Darwin's Dangerous Idea, argues that natural selection is a universal acid that eats through other theories, because it can explain just about everything, even the structure of the mind. Emanuel (Manny) Schegloff (1987) in ‘Between Micro and Macro: Context and Other Connections’ opposes the importation of ‘macro’ (sociological/sociolinguistic) factors into the ‘micro’ (interaction analysis), suggesting that one might reverse the strategy instead. Like Darwin, he is coy about whether he just wants his own turf, but the idea opens up the possibility of interactional reductionism. I will argue against interactional reductionism on methodological grounds: Don't bite off more than you can chew! Instead I'll support the good old Durkheimian strategy of looking for intermediate variables between systems of different orders. I try and make the case with data from Rossel Island, Papua New Guinea.

Abstract

This paper confronts Kant’s (1768) view of human conceptions of space as fundamentally divided along the three planes of the human body with an empirical case study in the Mayan community of Tenejapa in southern Mexico, whose inhabitants do not use left/right distinctions to project regions in space. Tenejapans have names for the left hand and the right hand, and also a term for hand/arm in general, but they do not generalize the distinction to spatial regions -- there is no linguistic expression glossing as 'to the left' or 'on the left-hand side', for example. Tenejapans also show a remarkable indifference to incongruous counterparts. Nor is there any system of value associations with the left and the right. The Tenejapan evidence that speaks to these Kantian themes points in two directions: (a) Kant was wrong to think that the structure of spatial regions founded on the human frame, and in particular the distinctions based on left and right, are in some sense essential human intuitions; (b) Kant may have been right to think that the left/right opposition, the perception of enantiomorphs, clockwiseness, East-West dichotomies, etc., are intimately connected to an overall system of spatial conception.