Publications

Abstract

We investigated whether augmenting instructional animations with a body analogy (BA) would improve 10- to 13-year-old children’s learning about class-1 levers. Children with a lower level of general math skill who learned with an instructional animation that provided a BA of the physical system, showed higher accuracy on a lever problem-solving reaction time task than children studying the instructional animation without this BA. Additionally, learning with a BA led to a higher speed–accuracy trade-off during the transfer task for children with a lower math skill, which provided additional evidence that especially this group is likely to be affected by learning with a BA. However, overall accuracy and solving speed on the transfer task was not affected by learning with or without this BA. These results suggest that providing children with a BA during animation study provides a stepping-stone for understanding mechanical principles of a physical system, which may prove useful for instructional designers. Yet, because the BA does not seem effective for all children, nor for all tasks, the degree of effectiveness of body analogies should be studied further. Future research, we conclude, should be more sensitive to the necessary degree of analogous mapping between the body and physical systems, and whether this mapping is effective for reasoning about more complex instantiations of such physical systems.

Abstract

Previous research indicates that sensori‐motor experience with physical systems can have a positive effect on learning. However, it is not clear whether this effect is caused by mere bodily engagement or the intrinsically meaningful information that such interaction affords in performing the learning task. We investigated (N = 74), through the use of a Wii Balance Board, whether different forms of physical engagement that was either meaningfully, non‐meaningfully, or minimally related to the learning content would be beneficial (or detrimental) to learning about the workings of seesaws from instructional animations. The results were inconclusive, indicating that motoric competency on lever problem solving did not significantly differ between conditions, nor were response speed and transfer performance affected. These findings suggest that adult's implicit and explicit knowledge about physical systems is stable and not easily affected by (contradictory) sensori‐motor experiences. Implications for embodied learning are discussed.

Abstract

Two broad approaches have dominated the literature on the production of speech-accompanying gestures. On the one hand, there are approaches that aim to explain the origin of gestures by specifying the mental processes that give rise to them. On the other, there are approaches that aim to explain the cognitive function that gestures have for the gesturer or the listener. In the present paper we aim to reconcile both approaches in one single perspective that is informed by a recent sea change in cognitive science, namely, Predictive Processing Perspectives (PPP; Clark 2013b; 2015). We start with the idea put forth by the Gesture as Simulated Action (GSA) framework (Hostetter, Alibali 2008). Under this view, the mental processes that give rise to gesture are re-enactments of sensori-motor experiences (i.e., simulated actions). We show that such anticipatory sensori-motor states and the constraints put forth by the GSA framework can be understood as top-down kinesthetic predictions that function in a broader predictive machinery as proposed by PPP. By establishing this alignment, we aim to show how gestures come to fulfill a genuine cognitive function above and beyond the mental processes that give rise to gesture.

Abstract

Non-communicative hand gestures have been found to benefit problem-solving performance. These gestures seem to compensate for limited internal cognitive capacities, such as visual working memory capacity. Yet, it is not clear how gestures might perform this cognitive function. One hypothesis is that gesturing is a means to spatially index mental simulations, thereby reducing the need for visually projecting the mental simulation onto the visual presentation of the task. If that hypothesis is correct, less eye movements should be made when participants gesture during problem solving than when they do not gesture. We therefore used mobile eye tracking to investigate the effect of co-thought gesturing and visual working memory capacity on eye movements during mental solving of the Tower of Hanoi problem. Results revealed that gesturing indeed reduced the number of eye movements (lower saccade counts), especially for participants with a relatively lower visual working memory capacity. Subsequent problem-solving performance was not affected by having (not) gestured during the mental solving phase. The current findings suggest that our understanding of gestures in problem solving could be improved by taking into account eye movements during gesturing.

Abstract

Previous research has established that gesture observation aids learning in children. The current study examinedwhether observation of gestures (i.e. depictive and tracing gestures) differentially affected verbal and visual–spatial retention whenlearning a route and its street names. Specifically, we explored whether children (n = 97) with lower visual and verbal working-memory capacity benefited more from observing gestures as compared with children who score higher on these traits. To thisend, 11- to 13-year-old children were presented with an instructional video of a route containing no gestures, depictive gestures,tracing gestures or both depictive and tracing gestures. Results indicated that the type of observed gesture affected performance:Observing tracing gestures or both tracing and depictive gestures increased performance on route retention, while observingdepictive gestures or both depictive and tracing gestures increased performance on street name retention. These effects werenot differentially affected by working-memory capacity

Abstract

Recent literature on learning with instructional manipulatives seems to call for a moderate view on the effects of perceptual and interactive richness of instructional manipulatives on learning. This “moderate view” holds that manipulatives’ perceptual and interactive richness may compromise learning in two ways: (1) by imposing a very high cognitive load on the learner, and (2) by hindering drawing of symbolic inferences that are supposed to play a key role in transfer (i.e., application of knowledge to new situations in the absence of instructional manipulatives). This paper presents a contrasting view. Drawing on recent insights from Embedded Embodied perspectives on cognition, it is argued that (1) perceptual and interactive richness may provide opportunities for alleviating cognitive load (Embedded Cognition), and (2) transfer of learning is not reliant on decontextualized knowledge but may draw on previous sensorimotor experiences of the kind afforded by perceptual and interactive richness of manipulatives (Embodied Cognition). By negotiating the Embedded Embodied Cognition view with the moderate view, implications for research are derived.

Abstract

Gestures are often considered to be demonstrative of the embodied nature of the mind (Hostetter and Alibali, 2008). In this article, we review current theories and research targeted at the intra-cognitive role of gestures. We ask the question how can gestures support internal cognitive processes of the gesturer? We suggest that extant theories are in a sense disembodied, because they focus solely on embodiment in terms of the sensorimotor neural precursors of gestures. As a result, current theories on the intra-cognitive role of gestures are lacking in explanatory scope to address how gestures-as-bodily-acts fulfill a cognitive function. On the basis of recent theoretical appeals that focus on the possibly embedded/extended cognitive role of gestures (Clark, 2013), we suggest that gestures are external physical tools of the cognitive system that replace and support otherwise solely internal cognitive processes. That is gestures provide the cognitive system with a stable external physical and visual presence that can provide means to think with. We show that there is a considerable amount of overlap between the way the human cognitive system has been found to use its environment, and how gestures are used during cognitive processes. Lastly, we provide several suggestions of how to investigate the embedded/extended perspective of the cognitive function of gestures.