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Pouw, W., Van Gog, T., Zwaan, R. A., Agostinho, S., & Paas, F. (2018). Co-thought gestures in children's mental problem solving: Prevalence and effects on subsequent performance. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 32(1), 66-80. doi:10.1002/acp.3380.
Abstract
Co-thought gestures are understudied as compared to co-speech gestures yet, may provide insight into cognitive functions of gestures that are independent of speech processes. A recent study with adults showed that co-thought gesticulation occurred spontaneously during mental preparation of problem solving. Moreover, co-thought gesturing (either spontaneous or instructed) during mental preparation was effective for subsequent solving of the Tower of Hanoi under conditions of high cognitive load (i.e., when visual working memory capacity was limited and when the task was more difficult). In this preregistered study (), we investigated whether co-thought gestures would also spontaneously occur and would aid problem-solving processes in children (N=74; 8-12years old) under high load conditions. Although children also spontaneously used co-thought gestures during mental problem solving, this did not aid their subsequent performance when physically solving the problem. If these null results are on track, co-thought gesture effects may be different in adults and children.Files private
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Pouw, W., & Looren de Jong, H. (2015). Rethinking situated and embodied social psychology. Theory and Psychology, 25(4), 411-433. doi:10.1177/0959354315585661.
Abstract
This article aims to explore the scope of a Situated and Embodied Social Psychology (ESP). At first sight, social cognition seems embodied cognition par excellence. Social cognition is first and foremost a supra-individual, interactive, and dynamic process (Semin & Smith, 2013). Radical approaches in Situated/Embodied Cognitive Science (Enactivism) claim that social cognition consists in an emergent pattern of interaction between a continuously coupled organism and the (social) environment; it rejects representationalist accounts of cognition (Hutto & Myin, 2013). However, mainstream ESP (Barsalou, 1999, 2008) still takes a rather representation-friendly approach that construes embodiment in terms of specific bodily formatted representations used (activated) in social cognition. We argue that mainstream ESP suffers from vestiges of theoretical solipsism, which may be resolved by going beyond internalistic spirit that haunts mainstream ESP today.
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